AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MatrixGame

structureimported Lean

A finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row i : I, Player II chooses column j : J. Payoff to Player I is g i j (in the scalar field 𝕜); payoff to Player II is -g i j. The scalar field 𝕜 defaults to ℚ so that unannotated MatrixGame I J means a rational matrix game — keeping the data structure Bourbaki-minimal and forcing the choice of ℝ (or any other ordered field) to be explicit at the use site.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators Matrix in
structure MatrixGame (I J : Type*) (𝕜 : Type := ℚ)
Defined in
EconCSLib, `MatrixGame`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Used by 79

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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators Matrix in
/-- A finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row `i : I`, Player II chooses column `j : J`. Payoff to Player I is `g i j` (in the scalar field `𝕜`); payoff to Player II is `-g i j`. The scalar field `𝕜` defaults to `ℚ` so that unannotated `MatrixGame I J` means a rational matrix game — keeping the data structure Bourbaki-minimal and forcing the choice of `ℝ` (or any other ordered field) to be explicit at the use site. -/
structure MatrixGame (I J : Type*) (𝕜 : Type := ℚ) where
  /-- The payoff matrix. -/
  g : I → J → 𝕜
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