MinimaxLoomis.E
defimported Lean
Expected payoff of a matrix game A : I → J → ℝ under mixed strategies x : stdSimplex ℝ I and y : stdSimplex ℝ J.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in noncomputable def MinimaxLoomis.E (A : I → J → ℝ) (x : stdSimplex ℝ I) (y : stdSimplex ℝ J) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MinimaxLoomis.E`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MinimaxLoomis.E← MinimaxLoomis.E (EconCSLib/Math/Minimax/MinimaxLoomis.lean:54): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- wsumWeighted sum of
fwith weights from a simplex elementx. Thinabbrevover Mathlib's finite dot product⬝ᵥ: definitionally equal,… - wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
- wsumWeighted sum of
- Used by 1
- MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0Weak duality for the two-player zero-sum matrix game: every maxmin value is bounded by every minmax value.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in /-- Expected payoff of a matrix game `A : I → J → ℝ` under mixed strategies `x : stdSimplex ℝ I` and `y : stdSimplex ℝ J`. -/ noncomputable def MinimaxLoomis.E (A : I → J → ℝ) (x : stdSimplex ℝ I) (y : stdSimplex ℝ J) : ℝ := wsum x (fun i => wsum y (A i))