AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MinimaxLoomis.E

defimported Lean

Expected payoff of a matrix game A : I → J → ℝ under mixed strategies x : stdSimplex ℝ I and y : stdSimplex ℝ J.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
noncomputable def MinimaxLoomis.E (A : I → J → ℝ) (x : stdSimplex ℝ I) (y : stdSimplex ℝ J) : ℝ
Defined in
EconCSLib, `MinimaxLoomis.E`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • wsumWeighted sum of f with weights from a simplex element x. Thin abbrev over Mathlib's finite dot product ⬝ᵥ: definitionally equal,…
  • wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
Used by 1
  • MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0Weak duality for the two-player zero-sum matrix game: every maxmin value is bounded by every minmax value.

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
/-- Expected payoff of a matrix game `A : I → J → ℝ` under mixed strategies `x : stdSimplex ℝ I` and `y : stdSimplex ℝ J`. -/
noncomputable def MinimaxLoomis.E (A : I → J → ℝ) (x : stdSimplex ℝ I) (y : stdSimplex ℝ J) : ℝ :=
  wsum x (fun i => wsum y (A i))
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