MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Weak duality for the two-player zero-sum matrix game: every maxmin value is bounded by every minmax value.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in theorem MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0 (A : I → J → ℝ) : lam0 A ≤ mu0 A
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0← MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0 (EconCSLib/Math/Minimax/MinimaxLoomis.lean:194): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 10
- MinimaxLoomis.mu0Player II's minmax value (the column player's best cap).
- wsumWeighted sum of
fwith weights from a simplex elementx. Thinabbrevover Mathlib's finite dot product⬝ᵥ: definitionally equal,… - MinimaxLoomis.exists_xx_lam0There exists a mixed strategy
xxwhose column-payoffs all dominatelam0 A. Compactness + continuity gives a maximiser oflam.aux;… - MinimaxLoomis.exists_yy_mu0There exists a mixed strategy
yywhose row-payoffs are all dominated bymu0 A. - le_iff_simplex_le
f ≤ vpointwise iff every simplex weighted sum is≤ v. - wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
- wsum_wsum_commExchange order of double weighted sums.
- MinimaxLoomis.EExpected payoff of a matrix game
A : I → J → ℝunder mixed strategiesx : stdSimplex ℝ Iandy : stdSimplex ℝ J. - ge_iff_simplex_ge
f ≥ vpointwise iff every simplex weighted sum is≥ v. - MinimaxLoomis.lam0Player I's maxmin value (the row player's best guarantee).
- Used by 1
- MatrixGame.maximin_le_minimaxMaximin ≤ minimax (always holds, for any matrix game). This is the finite weak-duality inequality.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset BigOperators inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false invariable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in/-- Weak duality for the two-player zero-sum matrix game: every maxmin value is bounded by every minmax value. -/theorem MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0 (A : I → J → ℝ) : lam0 A ≤ mu0 A := by obtain ⟨xx, Hxx⟩ := exists_xx_lam0 A obtain ⟨yy, Hyy⟩ := exists_yy_mu0 A calc lam0 A ≤ E A xx yy := by rw [E, wsum_wsum_comm] exact (ge_iff_simplex_ge.mp Hxx) yy _ ≤ mu0 A := by rw [E] exact (le_iff_simplex_le.mp Hyy) xx