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MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Weak duality for the two-player zero-sum matrix game: every maxmin value is bounded by every minmax value.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
theorem MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0 (A : I → J → ℝ) : lam0 A ≤ mu0 A
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 10
  • MinimaxLoomis.mu0Player II's minmax value (the column player's best cap).
  • wsumWeighted sum of f with weights from a simplex element x. Thin abbrev over Mathlib's finite dot product ⬝ᵥ: definitionally equal,…
  • MinimaxLoomis.exists_xx_lam0There exists a mixed strategy xx whose column-payoffs all dominate lam0 A. Compactness + continuity gives a maximiser of lam.aux;…
  • MinimaxLoomis.exists_yy_mu0There exists a mixed strategy yy whose row-payoffs are all dominated by mu0 A.
  • le_iff_simplex_lef ≤ v pointwise iff every simplex weighted sum is ≤ v.
  • wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
  • wsum_wsum_commExchange order of double weighted sums.
  • MinimaxLoomis.EExpected payoff of a matrix game A : I → J → ℝ under mixed strategies x : stdSimplex ℝ I and y : stdSimplex ℝ J.
  • ge_iff_simplex_gef ≥ v pointwise iff every simplex weighted sum is ≥ v.
  • MinimaxLoomis.lam0Player I's maxmin value (the row player's best guarantee).
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset BigOperators inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false invariable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in/-- Weak duality for the two-player zero-sum matrix game: every maxmin value is bounded by every minmax value. -/theorem MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0 (A : I → J → ℝ) : lam0 A ≤ mu0 A := by  obtain ⟨xx, Hxx⟩ := exists_xx_lam0 A  obtain ⟨yy, Hyy⟩ := exists_yy_mu0 A  calc lam0 A      ≤ E A xx yy := by        rw [E, wsum_wsum_comm]        exact (ge_iff_simplex_ge.mp Hxx) yy    _ ≤ mu0 A := by        rw [E]        exact (le_iff_simplex_le.mp Hyy) xx
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