AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

OnlineLearning.finiteUpperValue

defimported Lean

The upper value of $G$ is \[ v^+(G) \;=\; \inf_{q \in \Delta_N}\; \sup_{i \in [M]}\; \mathrm{pureVsPayoff}(G,i,q), \] where the column player minimises over mixed strategies and the row player maximises over pure responses.

Statement

set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in
set_option autoImplicit false in
open Real Finset BigOperators in
noncomputable def OnlineLearning.finiteUpperValue {M N : ℕ} (G : ZeroSumGame M N) : ℝ
Defined in
TCSlib, `OnlineLearning.finiteUpperValue`
Lean proof
By Karim Abdel Sadek, Mark Bedaywi, from github.com/Shilun-Allan-Li/tcslib at c8a02591b1e5 (Copyright (c) 2026 Karim Abdel Sadek and Mark Bedaywi. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.25.0.
Verified
07 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 3
  • pureVsPayoffGiven a game $G$, a pure row $i$, and a mixed column strategy $q$, the expected payoff of row $i$ against $q$ is…
  • MixedStrategyA mixed strategy over $n$ actions is a record consisting of a weight function $w : \mathrm{Fin}\,n \to \mathbb{R}$ together with…
  • ZeroSumGameA finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions is a record consisting of a payoff matrix…
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in
set_option autoImplicit false in
open Real Finset BigOperators in
/-- The upper value of a finite zero-sum game: the infimum over column mixed strategies `q` of the supremum over pure rows `i` of the payoff of `i` against `q` (column commits to a mixed strategy, then row chooses the best pure response). [CBL06, §7.2]. -/
noncomputable def OnlineLearning.finiteUpperValue {M N : ℕ} (G : ZeroSumGame M N) : ℝ :=
  ⨅ q : MixedStrategy N, ⨆ i : Fin M, pureVsPayoff G i q
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