AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

pureVsPayoff

defimported Lean

Given a game $G$, a pure row $i$, and a mixed column strategy $q$, the expected payoff of row $i$ against $q$ is \[ \mathrm{pureVsPayoff}(G, i, q) \;=\; \sum_{j} A_{ij} \cdot q_j. \]

Statement

set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in
set_option autoImplicit false in
open Real Finset BigOperators in
noncomputable def pureVsPayoff {M N : ℕ} (G : ZeroSumGame M N)
    (i : Fin M) (q : MixedStrategy N) : ℝ
Defined in
TCSlib, `pureVsPayoff`
Lean proof
By Karim Abdel Sadek, Mark Bedaywi, from github.com/Shilun-Allan-Li/tcslib at c8a02591b1e5 (Copyright (c) 2026 Karim Abdel Sadek and Mark Bedaywi. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.25.0.
Verified
07 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • MixedStrategyA mixed strategy over $n$ actions is a record consisting of a weight function $w : \mathrm{Fin}\,n \to \mathbb{R}$ together with…
  • ZeroSumGameA finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions is a record consisting of a payoff matrix…
Used by 10
  • OnlineLearning.pureVsPayoff_nonnegNonnegativity of a pure row's expected payoff. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions,…
  • OnlineLearning.finite_minimax_valueMinimax theorem for finite zero-sum games. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, whose…
  • minimax_approx_theoremApproximate minimax theorem for finite zero-sum games. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with payoff matrix $A$, having at…
  • weak_dualityWeak duality for finite zero-sum games. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M \ge 1$ row actions and $N \ge 1$ column…
  • OnlineLearning.finiteUpperValueThe upper value of $G$ is \[ v^+(G) \;=\; \inf_{q \in \Delta_N}\; \sup_{i \in [M]}\; \mathrm{pureVsPayoff}(G,i,q), \] where the…
  • OnlineLearning.pureVsPayoff_le_onePure row payoff against a mixed column is at most one. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column…
  • OnlineLearning.finiteUpperValue_bddBelowLower boundedness of the row-supremum values. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M \ge 1$ row actions and $N$ column…
  • hedge_constructionHedge yields an approximate minimax pair. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M \ge 2$ row actions and $N \ge 1$ column…
  • pureVsPayoff_empiricalStrategyPure-row payoff against the empirical column strategy. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N \ge 1$…
  • approx_minimaxApproximate minimax for finite zero-sum games. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with payoff matrix $A$, having $M \ge 2$ row…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in
set_option autoImplicit false in
open Real Finset BigOperators in
/-- The expected payoff to the row player when the row plays the pure action `i` and the column plays the mixed strategy `q`: the sum over columns `j` of `A(i, j) · q j` (in matrix form, `e_iᵀ A q`). [CBL06, §7.1]; [FS99, §2]. -/
noncomputable def pureVsPayoff {M N : ℕ} (G : ZeroSumGame M N)
    (i : Fin M) (q : MixedStrategy N) : ℝ :=
  ∑ j : Fin N, G.payoff i j * q.weights j
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