pureVsPayoff
defimported Lean
Given a game $G$, a pure row $i$, and a mixed column strategy $q$, the expected payoff of row $i$ against $q$ is \[ \mathrm{pureVsPayoff}(G, i, q) \;=\; \sum_{j} A_{ij} \cdot q_j. \]
Statement
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in set_option autoImplicit false in open Real Finset BigOperators in noncomputable def pureVsPayoff {M N : ℕ} (G : ZeroSumGame M N) (i : Fin M) (q : MixedStrategy N) : ℝ
- Defined in
- TCSlib, `pureVsPayoff`
- Lean proof
- By Karim Abdel Sadek, Mark Bedaywi, from github.com/Shilun-Allan-Li/tcslib at
c8a02591b1e5(Copyright (c) 2026 Karim Abdel Sadek and Mark Bedaywi. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.25.0.pureVsPayoff← pureVsPayoff (TCSlib/LearningTheory/Minimax/ZeroSumGame.lean:72): verbatim
- Verified
- 07 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- MixedStrategyA mixed strategy over $n$ actions is a record consisting of a weight function $w : \mathrm{Fin}\,n \to \mathbb{R}$ together with…
- ZeroSumGameA finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions is a record consisting of a payoff matrix…
- Used by 10
- OnlineLearning.pureVsPayoff_nonnegNonnegativity of a pure row's expected payoff. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions,…
- OnlineLearning.finite_minimax_valueMinimax theorem for finite zero-sum games. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, whose…
- minimax_approx_theoremApproximate minimax theorem for finite zero-sum games. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with payoff matrix $A$, having at…
- weak_dualityWeak duality for finite zero-sum games. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M \ge 1$ row actions and $N \ge 1$ column…
- OnlineLearning.finiteUpperValueThe upper value of $G$ is \[ v^+(G) \;=\; \inf_{q \in \Delta_N}\; \sup_{i \in [M]}\; \mathrm{pureVsPayoff}(G,i,q), \] where the…
- OnlineLearning.pureVsPayoff_le_onePure row payoff against a mixed column is at most one. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column…
- OnlineLearning.finiteUpperValue_bddBelowLower boundedness of the row-supremum values. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M \ge 1$ row actions and $N$ column…
- hedge_constructionHedge yields an approximate minimax pair. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M \ge 2$ row actions and $N \ge 1$ column…
- pureVsPayoff_empiricalStrategyPure-row payoff against the empirical column strategy. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N \ge 1$…
- approx_minimaxApproximate minimax for finite zero-sum games. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with payoff matrix $A$, having $M \ge 2$ row…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in set_option autoImplicit false in open Real Finset BigOperators in /-- The expected payoff to the row player when the row plays the pure action `i` and the column plays the mixed strategy `q`: the sum over columns `j` of `A(i, j) · q j` (in matrix form, `e_iᵀ A q`). [CBL06, §7.1]; [FS99, §2]. -/ noncomputable def pureVsPayoff {M N : ℕ} (G : ZeroSumGame M N) (i : Fin M) (q : MixedStrategy N) : ℝ := ∑ j : Fin N, G.payoff i j * q.weights j