AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Profile.deviate_of_ne

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

At any other index, the profile is unchanged.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {N : Type*} {S : N → Type*} [DecidableEq N] in
@[simp]
theorem Profile.deviate_of_ne (σ : Profile N S) (i : N) (s' : S i) {j : N} (h : j ≠ i) :
    deviate σ i s' j = σ j
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `Profile.deviate_of_ne`
Lean proof
By xbei, Claude (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
propext
Built on 4
  • ProfileA strategy profile: a dependent function assigning a value to each index. Compatibility alias only. Prefer game-bound profile aliases such…
  • deviateUnilateral deviation: index i switches to s', all others keep their value. This is Function.update with a game-theoretic name.
  • Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated index, the profile returns the new value.
  • Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same value is the identity.
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N : Type*} {S : N → Type*} [DecidableEq N] in/-- At any other index, the profile is unchanged. -/@[simp]theorem Profile.deviate_of_ne (σ : Profile N S) (i : N) (s' : S i) {j : N} (h : j ≠ i) :    deviate σ i s' j = σ j := by  simp [deviate, h]
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