Profile.deviate_of_ne
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
At any other index, the profile is unchanged.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N : Type*} {S : N → Type*} [DecidableEq N] in @[simp] theorem Profile.deviate_of_ne (σ : Profile N S) (i : N) (s' : S i) {j : N} (h : j ≠ i) : deviate σ i s' j = σ j
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Profile.deviate_of_ne`
- Lean proof
- By xbei, Claude (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Profile.deviate_of_ne← Profile.deviate_of_ne (EconCSLib/Foundation/Profile.lean:55): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
propext- Built on 4
- ProfileA strategy profile: a dependent function assigning a value to each index. Compatibility alias only. Prefer game-bound profile aliases such…
- deviateUnilateral deviation: index
iswitches tos', all others keep their value. This isFunction.updatewith a game-theoretic name. - Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated index, the profile returns the new value.
- Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same value is the identity.
- Used by 1
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N : Type*} {S : N → Type*} [DecidableEq N] in/-- At any other index, the profile is unchanged. -/@[simp]theorem Profile.deviate_of_ne (σ : Profile N S) (i : N) (s' : S i) {j : N} (h : j ≠ i) : deviate σ i s' j = σ j := by simp [deviate, h]