Profile.deviate_self
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Deviating to the same value is the identity.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N : Type*} {S : N → Type*} [DecidableEq N] in @[simp] theorem Profile.deviate_self (σ : Profile N S) (i : N) : deviate σ i (σ i) = σ
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Profile.deviate_self`
- Lean proof
- By xbei, Claude (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Profile.deviate_self← Profile.deviate_self (EconCSLib/Foundation/Profile.lean:43): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- Used by 5
- IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponseT2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player
iplays it. - Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated index, the profile returns the new value.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- Profile.deviate_of_neAt any other index, the profile is unchanged.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survivesNash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31]
- IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponseT2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N : Type*} {S : N → Type*} [DecidableEq N] in/-- Deviating to the same value is the identity. -/@[simp]theorem Profile.deviate_self (σ : Profile N S) (i : N) : deviate σ i (σ i) = σ := by simp [deviate]