SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEF1
defimported Lean
Envy-free up to one good (EF1): for any envied bundle, removing *some* item from it eliminates the envy. ∀ i ≠ j, A_j nonempty → ∃ g ∈ A_j, v_i(A_j \ {g}) ≤ v_i(A_i). The Nonempty guard is needed because the existential is vacuous for A j = ∅ (an agent cannot envy an empty bundle). EF1 always exists; see RoundRobin.lean. [AGT Ch.11; Lipton et al. 2004]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEF1 [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation N G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEF1`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEF1← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEF1 (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/Fairness.lean:71): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
- Used by 6
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEFX.isEF1EFX implies EF1: the universal witness in EFX is in particular an existential witness for EF1.
- round_robin_three_agents_seven_goods_pne_ef1With three agents and seven goods, every pure Nash equilibrium of Round-Robin (nonnegative additive valuations) is EF1; so the eight-good…
- is_alpha_ef1_one_iff1-EF1 is EF1.
- round_robin_pne_ef1_of_card_le_two_mulWith n agents and at most 2n goods (every agent picks at most twice), every pure Nash equilibrium of Round-Robin, for nonnegative additive…
- round_robin_pne_ef1_of_card_le_two_mul_add_oneWith n agents and at most 2n + 1 goods, every pure Nash equilibrium of Round-Robin (nonnegative additive valuations) is EF1. For three…
- round_robin_pne_not_ef1_three_agents_eight_goodsThere is an instance with 3 agents, 8 goods and strictly positive additive valuations, and a pure Nash equilibrium of the Round-Robin…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in /-- Envy-free up to one good (EF1): for any envied bundle, removing *some* item from it eliminates the envy. `∀ i ≠ j, A_j nonempty → ∃ g ∈ A_j, v_i(A_j \ {g}) ≤ v_i(A_i)`. The `Nonempty` guard is needed because the existential is vacuous for `A j = ∅` (an agent cannot envy an empty bundle). EF1 always exists; see `RoundRobin.lean`. [AGT Ch.11; Lipton et al. 2004] -/ def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEF1 [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation N G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop := ∀ i j : N, i ≠ j → (A j).Nonempty → ∃ g ∈ A j, v.val i (A j \ {g}) ≤ v.val i (A i)