AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEFX

defimported Lean

Envy-free up to any good (EFX): for any envied bundle, removing *any* item from it eliminates the envy. ∀ i ≠ j, ∀ g ∈ A_j, v_i(A_j \ {g}) ≤ v_i(A_i). Strictly stronger than EF1 (any witness vs. some witness). EFX exists for n = 2 (trivial) and n = 3 (Chaudhury-Garg-Mehlhorn 2020). Existence for n ≥ 4 is the major open problem in fair division. [AGT Ch.11; EC 2020 arXiv:2005.06878]

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N G : Type*} in
def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEFX [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation N G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEFX`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N G : Type*} in
/-- Envy-free up to any good (EFX): for any envied bundle, removing *any* item from it eliminates the envy. `∀ i ≠ j, ∀ g ∈ A_j, v_i(A_j \ {g}) ≤ v_i(A_i)`. Strictly stronger than EF1 (any witness vs. some witness). EFX exists for n = 2 (trivial) and n = 3 (Chaudhury-Garg-Mehlhorn 2020). Existence for n ≥ 4 is the major open problem in fair division. [AGT Ch.11; EC 2020 arXiv:2005.06878] -/
def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEFX [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation N G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop :=
  ∀ i j : N, i ≠ j →
    ∀ g ∈ A j, v.val i (A j \ {g}) ≤ v.val i (A i)
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