SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEFX
defimported Lean
Envy-free up to any good (EFX): for any envied bundle, removing *any* item from it eliminates the envy. ∀ i ≠ j, ∀ g ∈ A_j, v_i(A_j \ {g}) ≤ v_i(A_i). Strictly stronger than EF1 (any witness vs. some witness). EFX exists for n = 2 (trivial) and n = 3 (Chaudhury-Garg-Mehlhorn 2020). Existence for n ≥ 4 is the major open problem in fair division. [AGT Ch.11; EC 2020 arXiv:2005.06878]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEFX [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation N G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEFX`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEFX← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEFX (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/Fairness.lean:85): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
- Used by 2
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEFX.isEF1EFX implies EF1: the universal witness in EFX is in particular an existential witness for EF1.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.efx_two_agents_two_goodsEFX for 2 agents and 2 goods: the allocation giving one good to each agent is EFX. For any two goods
g₀andg₁, the allocation…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in /-- Envy-free up to any good (EFX): for any envied bundle, removing *any* item from it eliminates the envy. `∀ i ≠ j, ∀ g ∈ A_j, v_i(A_j \ {g}) ≤ v_i(A_i)`. Strictly stronger than EF1 (any witness vs. some witness). EFX exists for n = 2 (trivial) and n = 3 (Chaudhury-Garg-Mehlhorn 2020). Existence for n ≥ 4 is the major open problem in fair division. [AGT Ch.11; EC 2020 arXiv:2005.06878] -/ def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEFX [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation N G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop := ∀ i j : N, i ≠ j → ∀ g ∈ A j, v.val i (A j \ {g}) ≤ v.val i (A i)