SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.egalitarianWelfare
abbrevimported Lean
Egalitarian social welfare: the minimum of all agents' bundle values. sw_E(A) = min_{i ∈ N} v_i(A_i). Maximizing egalitarian welfare yields the *maximin* allocation: it makes the worst-off agent as well off as possible. For this to be meaningful, agent valuations should be comparable (e.g., all normalized to total value 1 over all goods). Requires [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] so the minimum is taken over a nonempty set. [BCM Ch.12, Def 12.6]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in noncomputable abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.egalitarianWelfare [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] (v : Valuation N G) (A : Allocation N G) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.egalitarianWelfare`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.egalitarianWelfare← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.egalitarianWelfare (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/SocialWelfare.lean:81): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.egalitarianWelfareEgalitarian welfare: the minimum utility among agents.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_uniqueFor a unique agent, utilitarian welfare is just that agent's utility.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in /-- Egalitarian social welfare: the minimum of all agents' bundle values. `sw_E(A) = min_{i ∈ N} v_i(A_i)`. Maximizing egalitarian welfare yields the *maximin* allocation: it makes the worst-off agent as well off as possible. For this to be meaningful, agent valuations should be comparable (e.g., all normalized to total value 1 over all goods). Requires `[Fintype N] [Nonempty N]` so the minimum is taken over a nonempty set. [BCM Ch.12, Def 12.6] -/ noncomputable abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.egalitarianWelfare [Fintype N] [Nonempty N] (v : Valuation N G) (A : Allocation N G) : ℝ := SocialChoice.FairDivision.egalitarianWelfare v.val A