SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_unique
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
For a unique agent, utilitarian welfare is just that agent's utility.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators in variable {N S : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] in @[simp] lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_unique [Unique N] (u : N → S → ℝ) (A : Allocation N S) : utilitarianWelfare u A = u default (A default)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_unique`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_unique← SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_unique (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Welfare.lean:60): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.AllocationA fair-division allocation assigns each agent a share.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfareUtilitarian welfare: the sum of agents' utilities from their own shares.
- Used by 45
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChooseAlloc_zeroCutter (agent 0) receives the right piece when the chooser prefers left, and the left piece otherwise.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsProportionalProportionality for a cardinal instance, relative to a distinguished whole share and a supplied population size.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstanceA real-valued cardinal fair-division instance in the standard no-externality model.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutter_isEnvyFree_of_fairThe cutter (agent 0) does not envy the chooser at a fair cut. If the cut point
tsatisfiesIsFairCutPoint μ t, then agent 0 values… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChoose_isEnvyFreeBoth agents are envy-free at any fair cut point. This combines
chooser_isEnvyFree(unconditional) andcutter_isEnvyFree_of_fair… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.toGenericCardinalInstanceView a measure instance as a generic real-valued cardinal fair-division instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChooseAlloc_isAllocationFor any cut point
t, the cut-and-choose allocation is a complete measurable partition of[0,1]into two pieces. This holds regardless… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.egalitarianWelfareEgalitarian welfare for a cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsEquitableEquitability for a cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.toGenericCardinalInstanceView a divisible cardinal instance as a generic real-valued cardinal fair-division instance. The resource is the whole cake
Set.univ. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsUtilitarianOptimalUtilitarian optimal: no complete allocation of
allGoodsachieves strictly higher utilitarian (sum) social welfare.… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.Instance.feasibleFeasibility for a divisible instance: an allocation is a measurable partition of the cake.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.IsParetoOptimalPareto optimality for a divisible cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.IsProportionalProportionality for a measure-based divisible instance, stated in
ENNReal. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.IsEquitableEquitability for a divisible cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.nsmul_egalitarianWelfare_le_utilitarianWelfareWithout division, egalitarian welfare is bounded above by utilitarian welfare multiplied by the number of agents.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.egalitarianWelfareEgalitarian welfare for a divisible cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.feasibleFeasibility for a cardinal divisible instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.IsEquitableEquitability for a measure-based divisible instance, stated in
ENNReal. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsUtilitarianOptimalUtilitarian optimality for a cardinal instance, using the instance feasibility predicate.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsEnvyFreeEnvy-freeness for a cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.egalitarianWelfare_leEgalitarian welfare is bounded above by each agent's utility.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.IsEnvyFree.isProportionalEnvy-freeness implies proportionality for complete measure-based divisible allocations.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.toShareInstanceView a divisible cardinal instance as the induced generic ordinal no-externality instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsParetoOptimalPareto optimality for a cardinal instance, using the instance feasibility predicate.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfare_monoUtilitarian welfare is monotone: pointwise improvement implies welfare improvement. The valuation codomain is fixed to
ℝ, so no… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfareUtilitarian social welfare: the sum of all agents' bundle values.
sw_U(A) = ∑_{i ∈ N} v_i(A_i). Maximizing utilitarian welfare produces… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.isEnvyFree_iff_toCardinalInstance_isEnvyFreeFor finite measure instances, the raw
ENNRealenvy-freeness predicate agrees with the real-valued cardinal predicate induced bytoReal. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.ds_oneBase case: 1 agent receives the whole cake. Proportionality holds trivially on the whole unit interval.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsMaxminMaximin optimality for a cardinal instance, using the instance feasibility predicate.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.feasibleFeasibility for a measure-based divisible instance. Like the ordinal and cardinal divisible cases, this depends only on the ambient cake:…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminMaximin (egalitarian) optimal: no complete allocation of
allGoodsachieves higher egalitarian (minimum-agent) welfare. A maximin… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.utilitarianWelfareUtilitarian welfare for a cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.IsFairCutPointA cut point
tis fair (for the cutter, agent 0) if agent 0's measure is split equally:μ 0 [0, t] = μ 0 (t, 1]. At a fair cut the… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChooseAllocThe cut-and-choose allocation at cut point
t ∈ [0,1]. The chooser (agent 1) receives the half they value more: - If… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.toShareInstanceView a measure instance as the induced generic ordinal no-externality instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.chooser_isEnvyFreeThe chooser (agent 1) never envies the cutter, regardless of the cut point. Since agent 1 selects whichever piece they value more,…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.cutAndChooseAlloc_oneChooser (agent 1) receives the left piece if they prefer it, the right piece otherwise.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.IsProportionalProportionality for a divisible cardinal instance, relative to the whole cake.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.IsEnvyFreeEnvy-freeness for a divisible cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.egalitarianWelfareEgalitarian social welfare: the minimum of all agents' bundle values.
sw_E(A) = min_{i ∈ N} v_i(A_i). Maximizing egalitarian welfare… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.DubinsSpanierPropThe inductive predicate for the Dubins–Spanier algorithm: for n agents indexed by
Fin n, a complete proportional allocation exists. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.utilitarianWelfareUtilitarian welfare for a divisible cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.Instance.toShareInstanceView a divisible ordinal instance as a generic no-externality fair-division share instance. The resource is the whole cake
Set.univ. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.IsEnvyFreeEnvy-freeness for a measure-based divisible instance, stated in
ENNReal.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BigOperators invariable {N S : Type*} invariable [Fintype N] in/-- For a unique agent, utilitarian welfare is just that agent's utility. -/@[simp]lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_unique [Unique N] (u : N → S → ℝ) (A : Allocation N S) : utilitarianWelfare u A = u default (A default) := by simp [utilitarianWelfare]