SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue_le_of_forall
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The MMS value is at most any upper bound on all per-allocation minimum bundle values. If ub is an upper bound — for every complete allocation B, iInf_j v_i(B_j) ≤ ub — then mmsValue v allGoods i ≤ ub. hne is needed because ciSup_le requires the index type to be nonempty.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] in lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue_le_of_forall (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (i : N) (hne : Nonempty {A : Allocation N G // IsAllocation allGoods A}) (ub : ℝ) (h : ∀ B : Allocation N G, IsAllocation allGoods B → iInf (fun j : N => v.val i (B j)) ≤ ub) : mmsValue v allGoods i ≤ ub
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue_le_of_forall`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue_le_of_forall← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue_le_of_forall (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/MMS.lean:154): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 4
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAllocationA complete allocation partitions all goods among agents. *
disjoint: distinct agents receive disjoint bundles. *complete: every good… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValueThe maximin share (MMS) value of agent
iwith respect to valuationvand good setallGoods.…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue_le_proportional_share_additiveFor additive valuations, the MMS value is at most the proportional share:
n * mmsValue ≤ v_i(allGoods). *Proof*: For any completeB,…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue_le_proportional_share_additiveFor additive valuations, the MMS value is at most the proportional share:
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset invariable {N G : Type*} invariable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] in/-- The MMS value is at most any upper bound on all per-allocation minimum bundle values. If `ub` is an upper bound — for every complete allocation `B`, `iInf_j v_i(B_j) ≤ ub` — then `mmsValue v allGoods i ≤ ub`. `hne` is needed because `ciSup_le` requires the index type to be nonempty. -/lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue_le_of_forall (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (i : N) (hne : Nonempty {A : Allocation N G // IsAllocation allGoods A}) (ub : ℝ) (h : ∀ B : Allocation N G, IsAllocation allGoods B → iInf (fun j : N => v.val i (B j)) ≤ ub) : mmsValue v allGoods i ≤ ub := by haveI : Nonempty {A : Allocation N G // IsAllocation allGoods A} := hne exact ciSup_le fun ⟨B, hB⟩ => h B hB