SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue
The maximin share (MMS) value of agent i with respect to valuation v and good set allGoods. mmsValue v allGoods i = sup_{B : n-partition} inf_{j : N} v_i(B_j). Intuitively: the best (highest) minimum-bundle value agent i can guarantee by proposing a complete n-partition of allGoods. The outer iSup ranges over all complete allocations {B // IsAllocation allGoods B}; the inner iInf ranges over all agent indices j : N (the bundle labels). The corresponding predicate ("did agent i receive at least their MMS value?") is IsMaxminShare in Fairness.lean. See isMaxminShare_iff_isAlphaMMS_one for the connection. If no complete allocation exists (e.g., N = ∅), iSup over the empty subtype yields sSup ∅ = 0 in ℝ. Use [Nonempty N] to ensure a complete allocation exists. [Budish 2011; AGT Ch.11]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in noncomputable def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (i : N) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/MMS.lean:101): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAllocationA complete allocation partitions all goods among agents. *
disjoint: distinct agents receive disjoint bundles. *complete: every good… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
- Used by 9
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue_nonnegFor nonneg valuations with at least one complete allocation, the MMS value is nonneg.
hneensures theiSupis nonempty.[Fintype G]… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMSAn allocation
Ais α-MMS if every agent receives at leastαtimes their MMS value.… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isMaxminShare_iff_isAlphaMMS_one
IsMaxminSharefromFairness.leancoincides withIsAlphaMMS 1. → direction (IsMaxminShare → IsAlphaMMS 1): for every complete… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_zeroEvery allocation trivially satisfies 0-MMS for nonneg valuations.
0 * mmsValue = 0 ≤ v_i(A_i)byzero_muland nonnegativity. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue_le_proportional_share_additiveFor additive valuations, the MMS value is at most the proportional share:
n * mmsValue ≤ v_i(allGoods). *Proof*: For any completeB,… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminShare.isAlphaMMS
IsMaxminShareimplies α-MMS forα ≤ 1and nonneg MMS values. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue_le_of_forallThe MMS value is at most any upper bound on all per-allocation minimum bundle values. If
ubis an upper bound — for every complete… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_mono_alphaα-MMS is monotone decreasing in α: if
Ais α-MMS andβ ≤ α, thenAis β-MMS. *Proof*:β * mmsValue ≤ α * mmsValue ≤ v_i(A_i)… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.iInf_partition_le_mmsValueThe min-bundle value of any complete allocation is at most the MMS value. For any complete allocation
B:…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue_nonnegFor nonneg valuations with at least one complete allocation, the MMS value is nonneg.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in /-- The **maximin share (MMS) value** of agent `i` with respect to valuation `v` and good set `allGoods`. `mmsValue v allGoods i = sup_{B : n-partition} inf_{j : N} v_i(B_j)`. Intuitively: the best (highest) minimum-bundle value agent `i` can guarantee by proposing a complete `n`-partition of `allGoods`. The outer `iSup` ranges over all complete allocations `{B // IsAllocation allGoods B}`; the inner `iInf` ranges over all agent indices `j : N` (the bundle labels). The corresponding **predicate** ("did agent `i` receive at least their MMS value?") is `IsMaxminShare` in `Fairness.lean`. See `isMaxminShare_iff_isAlphaMMS_one` for the connection. If no complete allocation exists (e.g., `N = ∅`), `iSup` over the empty subtype yields `sSup ∅ = 0` in ℝ. Use `[Nonempty N]` to ensure a complete allocation exists. [Budish 2011; AGT Ch.11] -/ noncomputable def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValue [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (i : N) : ℝ := iSup fun B : {A : Allocation N G // IsAllocation allGoods A} => iInf fun j : N => v.val i (B.val j)