SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsUtilitarianOptimal
defimported Lean
Utilitarian optimality: no feasible allocation has larger utilitarian welfare.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators in variable {N S : Type*} in def SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsUtilitarianOptimal [Fintype N] (feasible : Allocation N S → Prop) (u : N → S → ℝ) (A : Allocation N S) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsUtilitarianOptimal`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsUtilitarianOptimal← SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsUtilitarianOptimal (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Welfare.lean:34): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.AllocationA fair-division allocation assigns each agent a share.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfareUtilitarian welfare: the sum of agents' utilities from their own shares.
- Used by 2
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsUtilitarianOptimalUtilitarian optimal: no complete allocation of
allGoodsachieves strictly higher utilitarian (sum) social welfare.… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsUtilitarianOptimalUtilitarian optimality for a cardinal instance, using the instance feasibility predicate.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsUtilitarianOptimalUtilitarian optimal: no complete allocation of
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators in variable {N S : Type*} in /-- Utilitarian optimality: no feasible allocation has larger utilitarian welfare. -/ def SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsUtilitarianOptimal [Fintype N] (feasible : Allocation N S → Prop) (u : N → S → ℝ) (A : Allocation N S) : Prop := ∀ B : Allocation N S, feasible B → utilitarianWelfare u B ≤ utilitarianWelfare u A