SocialChoice.FairDivision.Allocation
abbrevimported Lean
A fair-division allocation assigns each agent a share.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Allocation (N S : Type*)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Allocation`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Allocation← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Allocation (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Basic.lean:34): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 32
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.InstanceA fully general fair-division instance. This allows preferences over complete allocations, so it can express externalities or other global…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsProportionalProportional: each agent values their share at least
1 / nof a distinguished whole share, stated without division. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.RuleA fair-division rule returns a feasible allocation for every instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.egalitarianWelfareEgalitarian welfare: the minimum utility among agents.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsProportionalProportionality for a cardinal instance, relative to a distinguished whole share and a supplied population size.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstanceA real-valued cardinal fair-division instance in the standard no-externality model.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_monoUtilitarian welfare is monotone: pointwise improvement implies welfare improvement.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsParetoOptimalPareto optimal: there is no feasible allocation that weakly improves every agent and strictly improves at least one.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.egalitarianWelfareEgalitarian welfare for a cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.ShareInstance.toInstanceLift a no-externality fair-division instance to a fully general allocation-preference instance by comparing allocations pointwise through…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.SolutionConceptA fair-division solution concept is a predicate selecting acceptable allocations relative to a fully general instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.ShareInstanceA no-externality fair-division instance where each agent ranks only the share they personally receive.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsEquitableEquitability for a cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.toGenericCardinalInstanceView a divisible cardinal instance as a generic real-valued cardinal fair-division instance. The resource is the whole cake
Set.univ. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsUtilitarianOptimalUtilitarian optimal: no complete allocation of
allGoodsachieves strictly higher utilitarian (sum) social welfare.… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsParetoOptimalAn allocation
Ais Pareto optimal if no complete allocationBweakly improves every agent's bundle value and strictly improves at… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.nsmul_egalitarianWelfare_le_utilitarianWelfareWithout division, egalitarian welfare is bounded above by utilitarian welfare multiplied by the number of agents.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsUtilitarianOptimalUtilitarian optimality: no feasible allocation has larger utilitarian welfare.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsMaxminMaximin optimality: no feasible allocation has larger egalitarian welfare.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsEnvyFreeEnvy-free: every agent weakly prefers their own share to every other agent's share.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsUtilitarianOptimalUtilitarian optimality for a cardinal instance, using the instance feasibility predicate.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsEnvyFreeEnvy-freeness for a cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.egalitarianWelfare_leEgalitarian welfare is bounded above by each agent's utility.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsParetoOptimalPareto optimality for a cardinal instance, using the instance feasibility predicate.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_uniqueFor a unique agent, utilitarian welfare is just that agent's utility.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfareUtilitarian welfare: the sum of agents' utilities from their own shares.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsMaxminMaximin optimality for a cardinal instance, using the instance feasibility predicate.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminMaximin (egalitarian) optimal: no complete allocation of
allGoodsachieves higher egalitarian (minimum-agent) welfare. A maximin… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.utilitarianWelfareUtilitarian welfare for a cardinal instance.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsEquitableEquitable: all agents obtain the same utility from their own shares.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.AllocationA divisible allocation assigns each agent
i : Na piece (a measurable subset) of the cakeΩ. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.Instance.toShareInstanceView a divisible ordinal instance as a generic no-externality fair-division share instance. The resource is the whole cake
Set.univ.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in /-- A fair-division allocation assigns each agent a share. -/ abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Allocation (N S : Type*) := N → S