SocialChoice.Voting.permuteVoters
defimported Lean
Relabel voters by a permutation of the electorate.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in def SocialChoice.Voting.permuteVoters [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (σ : Equiv.Perm N) : Profile N A
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.permuteVoters`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.permuteVoters← SocialChoice.Voting.permuteVoters (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:180): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.AnonymityAnonymity: relabeling voters does not change the winner set.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- Relabel voters by a permutation of the electorate. -/ def SocialChoice.Voting.permuteVoters [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (σ : Equiv.Perm N) : Profile N A where pref := fun i => P.pref (σ i)