SocialChoice.Voting.Profile
structureimported Lean
A voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in structure SocialChoice.Voting.Profile (N A : Type*) [Fintype N] [Fintype A]
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.Profile`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.Profile← SocialChoice.Voting.Profile (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:35): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 70
- SocialChoice.Voting.votersPreferringVoters who strictly prefer
atob. - SocialChoice.Voting.MajorityPrefersPairwise majority comparison.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteA voting rule is resolute if it always returns exactly one winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoreCandidateTotal score for a candidate under a positional score vector.
- SocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoiceSocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoice
- SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetCycleProfileThe standard Condorcet cycle profile: voter 0 ranks
0 > 1 > 2, voter 1 ranks1 > 2 > 0, and voter 2 ranks2 > 0 > 1. - SocialChoice.Voting.PessimistStrategyproofnessPessimist strategyproofness for set-valued rules.
- SocialChoice.Voting.copeland_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.copeland_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.HasCondorcetWinnerA profile has at least one Condorcet winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile_specSocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile_spec
- SocialChoice.Voting.unanimity_univ_isDecisiveSocialChoice.Voting.unanimity_univ_isDecisive
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strictSocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict
- SocialChoice.Voting.Profile.extSocialChoice.Voting.Profile.ext
- SocialChoice.Voting.permuteCandidatesRelabel candidates by applying the inverse permutation to each ballot.
- SocialChoice.Voting.permuteVotersRelabel voters by a permutation of the electorate.
- SocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfileSocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile
- SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_neSocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_ne
- SocialChoice.Voting.marginPairwise majority margin: voters preferring
atobminus voters preferringbtoa. - SocialChoice.Voting.MonotonicityMonotonicity: raising a selected alternative cannot make it unselected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIAIndependence of irrelevant alternatives for SWFs.
- SocialChoice.Voting.CondorcetWinner
ais a Condorcet winner if it beats every other alternative by strict pairwise majority. - SocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile_specSocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile_spec
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choiceSocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRuleGeneric positional scoring rule. The first argument is the number of alternatives, and the second is the zero-based rank.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteStrategyproofnessStrategyproofness for resolute rules: changing one ballot cannot produce a strictly better unique winner for the deviating voter.
- SocialChoice.Voting.TopRankCandidate
ais top-ranked by voteri. - SocialChoice.Voting.relabelProfileRelabel a profile along an equivalence of alternative types.
- SocialChoice.Voting.updateProfileReplace one voter's ballot.
- SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymmSocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymm
- SocialChoice.Voting.SimpleLift
Qis obtained fromPby weakly raisinga: anything belowainPremains belowainQ, and anything aboveainQwas… - SocialChoice.Voting.copelandCopeland winners.
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forwardSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward
- SocialChoice.Voting.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for set-valued voting rules: no unanimously dominated alternative is selected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.DictatorialA rule is dictatorial if one voter always gets their top-ranked alternative as the unique winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfileSocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile
- SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosenIf every voter strictly prefers
atob, then a unanimous monotonic resolute voting rule cannot chooseb. This is the set-valued… - SocialChoice.Voting.scoringWinnersWinners with maximal score.
- SocialChoice.Voting.margin_selfSocialChoice.Voting.margin_self
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsTotalA voting rule is total if it always returns at least one winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.OptimistStrategyproofnessOptimist strategyproofness for set-valued rules.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for SWFs: unanimous strict preference forces social strict preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.margin_posPositive pairwise majority margin.
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringWinners_nonemptySocialChoice.Voting.scoringWinners_nonempty
- SocialChoice.Voting.CondorcetConsistencyA rule is Condorcet-consistent if every Condorcet winner is the unique winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile_erase_eq_updateSocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile_erase_eq_update
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWFA social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.prefers_transSocialChoice.Voting.prefers_trans
- SocialChoice.Voting.AnonymityAnonymity: relabeling voters does not change the winner set.
- SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_isDictatorSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_isDictator
- SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveForSocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_reflSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl
- SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile_insert_eq_updateSocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile_insert_eq_update
- SocialChoice.Voting.NeutralityNeutrality: relabeling candidates relabels the winner set.
- SocialChoice.Voting.constantProfileConstant profile where every voter submits the same ballot.
- SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfileSocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
- SocialChoice.Voting.topChoiceThe top-ranked alternative of voter
i. - SocialChoice.Voting.BottomRankCandidate
ais bottom-ranked by voteri. - SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonicStrategy-proofness implies monotonicity for finite voter sets. [MSZ 21.35]
- SocialChoice.Voting.margin_skewSocialChoice.Voting.margin_skew
- SocialChoice.Voting.copelandScoreCopeland score: pairwise majority wins minus pairwise majority losses.
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimityTop unanimity follows from weak-Pareto unanimity plus totality: if every voter ranks
afirst, thenais the unique winner. - SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveForA coalition is decisive for
aoverbif unanimous strict support inside the coalition forces the social strict preferencea ≻ b. - SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.DictatorialA SWF is dictatorial if one voter always determines every strict social comparison.
- SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorialSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial
- SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_memSocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem
- SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRankSocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRank
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveForWeak decisiveness tests a coalition against a complement unanimously supporting the opposite strict ranking.
- SocialChoice.Voting.votersPreferringVoters who strictly prefer
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- A voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives. -/ structure SocialChoice.Voting.Profile (N A : Type*) [Fintype N] [Fintype A] where /-- The ballot submitted by each voter. Smaller means more preferred. -/ pref : N → LinearOrder A