AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

VNM.sure_thing_principle

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

The Sure-Thing Principle [MSZ Ex 2.12]: The common lottery in a mixture does not affect strict preference. If Independence holds, then [α L₁, (1-α) L₃] ≻ [α L₂, (1-α) L₃] iff [α L₁, (1-α) L₄] ≻ [α L₂, (1-α) L₄] for any lotteries L₁, L₂, L₃, L₄ and α ∈ [0,1].

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
variable {𝕜 : Type*} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] in
variable {O : Type*} [Fintype O] in
theorem VNM.sure_thing_principle
    {pref : Lottery 𝕜 O → Lottery 𝕜 O → Prop}
    (hind : Independence pref)
    (L₁ L₂ L₃ L₄ : Lottery 𝕜 O)
    (α : 𝕜) (hα₀ : 0 ≤ α) (hα₁ : α ≤ 1) :
    strict pref (Lottery.mix α hα₀ hα₁ L₁ L₃) (Lottery.mix α hα₀ hα₁ L₂ L₃) ↔
    strict pref (Lottery.mix α hα₀ hα₁ L₁ L₄) (Lottery.mix α hα₀ hα₁ L₂ L₄)
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `VNM.sure_thing_principle`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 8
  • VNM.IndependenceIndependence: mixing both sides with a common lottery preserves preference. L₁ ≿ L₂ ↔ [α L₁, (1-α) N] ≿ [α L₂, (1-α) N] for α > 0.
  • LotteryA lottery over outcomes O: a probability distribution. Just stdSimplex 𝕜 O with a game-theoretic name.
  • TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where ≤ is total (complete). This is weaker than LinearOrder — it does NOT require antisymmetry or…
  • strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
  • LinearOrder.toTotalPreorderEvery LinearOrder is a TotalPreorder.
  • stdSimplex.mixConvex combination of two simplex points: mix α hα₀ hα₁ x y = α·x + (1-α)·y. This is the basic vocabulary for compound lotteries and for…
  • Lottery.mixConvex combination of two lotteries: the compound lottery [α(L₁), (1-α)(L₂)] after simplification. [MSZ Axiom 2.16] Alias of…
  • stdSimplex.mix_applystdSimplex.mix_apply

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset BigOperators invariable {𝕜 : Type*} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] invariable {O : Type*} [Fintype O] in/-- **The Sure-Thing Principle** [MSZ Ex 2.12]: The common lottery in a mixture does not affect strict preference. If Independence holds, then `[α L₁, (1-α) L₃] ≻ [α L₂, (1-α) L₃]` iff `[α L₁, (1-α) L₄] ≻ [α L₂, (1-α) L₄]` for any lotteries `L₁, L₂, L₃, L₄` and `α ∈ [0,1]`. -/theorem VNM.sure_thing_principle    {pref : Lottery 𝕜 O → Lottery 𝕜 O → Prop}    (hind : Independence pref)    (L₁ L₂ L₃ L₄ : Lottery 𝕜 O)    (α : 𝕜) (hα₀ : 0 ≤ α) (hα₁ : α ≤ 1) :    strict pref (Lottery.mix α hα₀ hα₁ L₁ L₃) (Lottery.mix α hα₀ hα₁ L₂ L₃) ↔    strict pref (Lottery.mix α hα₀ hα₁ L₁ L₄) (Lottery.mix α hα₀ hα₁ L₂ L₄) := by  rcases eq_or_lt_of_le hα₀ with rfl | hα_pos  · -- α = 0: both mixes collapse to L₃ (resp. L₄); strict X X is false    have h₃ : Lottery.mix 0 hα₀ hα₁ L₁ L₃ = Lottery.mix 0 hα₀ hα₁ L₂ L₃ :=      Subtype.ext (funext fun i => by simp [Lottery.mix, stdSimplex.mix])    have h₄ : Lottery.mix 0 hα₀ hα₁ L₁ L₄ = Lottery.mix 0 hα₀ hα₁ L₂ L₄ :=      Subtype.ext (funext fun i => by simp [Lottery.mix, stdSimplex.mix])    simp only [strict, h₃, h₄, and_not_self_iff]  · -- α > 0: Independence factors out the common lottery    constructor <;> intro ⟨h₁, h₂⟩ <;> [      exact ⟨(hind L₁ L₂ L₄ α hα_pos hα₁).mp ((hind L₁ L₂ L₃ α hα_pos hα₁).mpr h₁),             fun h => h₂ ((hind L₂ L₁ L₃ α hα_pos hα₁).mp ((hind L₂ L₁ L₄ α hα_pos hα₁).mpr h))⟩;      exact ⟨(hind L₁ L₂ L₃ α hα_pos hα₁).mp ((hind L₁ L₂ L₄ α hα_pos hα₁).mpr h₁),             fun h => h₂ ((hind L₂ L₁ L₄ α hα_pos hα₁).mp ((hind L₂ L₁ L₃ α hα_pos hα₁).mpr h))⟩    ]
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