strict
defimported Lean
Strict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in def strict {A : Type*} (R : A → A → Prop) (a b : A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `strict`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.strict← strict (EconCSLib/Foundation/Preference.lean:51): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 23
- op_1258_cyclic_ramsey_k2_l3The cyclic Ramsey number R_cyc(NM_4, MP_3) of the 2-edge nested matching NM_4 and the monotone path MP_3 is equal to 4.
- SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strictSocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict
- GS.prefM_strictGS.prefM_strict
- GS.stableMeet_isStableThe meet of two stable matchings is stable.
- Matching.IsBlockingA pair
(m, w)is a blocking pair for matchingμif bothmandwstrictly prefer each other to their current partners. [MSZ 22.5] - GS.daStep_NoAchievableRejectionInductive step (KEY LEMMA).
NoAchievableRejectionis preserved by onedaStep. Also threadsHoldInv(for the old-holder index… - Matching.IsIndividuallyRationalA matching is individually rational if every matched agent strictly prefers their partner to being unmatched.
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forwardSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward
- GS.opposed_preferencesOpposed preferences. Let
μbe a stable matching. If manjis matched to womanwjunder another matchingνand **strictly… - GS.stableJoin_isStableThe join of two stable matchings is stable.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for SWFs: unanimous strict preference forces social strict preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_reflSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl
- GS.opposed_preferences_womenDual of
opposed_preferences: if womanistrictly prefers manmito hercandidate-manmi', thenmistrictly prefers his… - strict_transitiveDerived strict preference is transitive when the weak relation is transitive.
- galeShapley_isStableGale-Shapley stability: the DA output has no blocking pair. The statement is in the *market* frame (
IsBlocking … (i : M) (j : W)).… - SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveForA coalition is decisive for
aoverbif unanimous strict support inside the coalition forces the social strict preferencea ≻ b. - GS.stable_matching_perfectIn the balanced full-preference one-to-one market, every stable matching is perfect: every woman and every man is matched. This is the…
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.DictatorialA SWF is dictatorial if one voter always determines every strict social comparison.
- SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorialSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial
- Pref.lt
p.lt a b: outcomeais strictly preferred tobunder preferencep. - VNM.sure_thing_principleThe Sure-Thing Principle [MSZ Ex 2.12]: The common lottery in a mixture does not affect strict preference. If Independence holds, then…
- GS.prefW_strictGS.prefW_strict
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveForWeak decisiveness tests a coalition against a complement unanimously supporting the opposite strict ranking.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in /-- Strict preference derived from a weak preference relation. -/ def strict {A : Type*} (R : A → A → Prop) (a b : A) : Prop := R a b ∧ ¬ R b a