agCyc
def
The cyclic game u_i(y) = (y_{i+1} + min(y_i, 2)) / 4: a player on strategy i gains from others on the "next" strategy i+1 and from company on its own strategy (up to two).
Statement
def agCyc (n s : ℕ) [NeZero s] : AGGame n s where u _ i y
- Source
- step towards ag_two_exact / ag_three_lower / ag_four_lower (Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games, FOCS 2007 (arXiv:0710.5582), concluding conjecture that s*lambda is a lower bound)
- Verified
- 06 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- AGGameAn anonymous game with n players and s strategies (setting of arXiv 0710.5582, "Computing equilibria in anonymous games", Section 2): the…
- Used by 6
- agCyc_regretFrom a regret-2 certificate on the totals to a player with regret 1/2.
- agCyc_normalizedThe cyclic game with n = 5 players has payoffs in [0, 1].
- agCyc_u_eqThe payoff of the cyclic anonymous game is the integer table agCycV divided by 4.
- agCyc_lipschitzThe cyclic game is 1/8-Lipschitz (for at least two strategies).
- ag_four_lowerFour strategies: the lower bound sλ is attained. The 5-player, 4-strategy cyclic game is normalised and λ = 1/8-Lipschitz, yet has no pure…
- ag_three_lowerThree strategies: the lower bound exceeds sλ. The 5-player, 3-strategy cyclic game is normalised and λ = 1/8-Lipschitz, yet has no pure…
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- The cyclic game `u_i(y) = (y_{i+1} + min(y_i, 2)) / 4`: a player on strategy `i` gains from others on the "next" strategy `i+1` and from company on its own strategy (up to two). -/ def agCyc (n s : ℕ) [NeZero s] : AGGame n s where u _ i y := ((y (i + 1) : ℚ) + min (y i : ℚ) 2) / 4