agCyc_u_eq
theoremverified
The payoff of the cyclic anonymous game is the integer table agCycV divided by 4.
Statement
theorem agCyc_u_eq {n s : ℕ} [NeZero s] (p : Fin n) (i : Fin s) (y : Fin s → ℕ) :
(agCyc n s).u p i y = (agCycV i y : ℚ) / 4- Source
- step towards ag_two_exact / ag_three_lower / ag_four_lower (Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games, FOCS 2007 (arXiv:0710.5582), concluding conjecture that s*lambda is a lower bound)
- Verified
- 06 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- Used by 2
- agCyc_regretFrom a regret-2 certificate on the totals to a player with regret 1/2.
- agCyc_normalizedThe cyclic game with n = 5 players has payoffs in [0, 1].
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
theorem agCyc_u_eq {n s : ℕ} [NeZero s] (p : Fin n) (i : Fin s) (y : Fin s → ℕ) : (agCyc n s).u p i y = (agCycV i y : ℚ) / 4 := by simp [agCyc, agCycV, Nat.cast_min]