AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

agCyc_u_eq

theoremverified

The payoff of the cyclic anonymous game is the integer table agCycV divided by 4.

Statement

theorem agCyc_u_eq {n s : ℕ} [NeZero s] (p : Fin n) (i : Fin s) (y : Fin s → ℕ) :
    (agCyc n s).u p i y = (agCycV i y : ℚ) / 4
Source
step towards ag_two_exact / ag_three_lower / ag_four_lower (Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games, FOCS 2007 (arXiv:0710.5582), concluding conjecture that s*lambda is a lower bound)
Verified
06 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 2
  • agCycThe cyclic game u_i(y) = (y_{i+1} + min(y_i, 2)) / 4: a player on strategy i gains from others on the "next" strategy i+1 and from company…
  • agCycVInteger numerator of the cyclic game's payoff.
Used by 2
  • agCyc_regretFrom a regret-2 certificate on the totals to a player with regret 1/2.
  • agCyc_normalizedThe cyclic game with n = 5 players has payoffs in [0, 1].

Lean source view module on GitHub

theorem agCyc_u_eq {n s : ℕ} [NeZero s] (p : Fin n) (i : Fin s) (y : Fin s → ℕ) :    (agCyc n s).u p i y = (agCycV i y : ℚ) / 4 := by  simp [agCyc, agCycV, Nat.cast_min]
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