condorcet_winner_not_of_majority_defeated
theoremverifiedformalization
If an alternative y is strictly preferred to alternative x by more voters than prefer x to y, then x cannot be a Condorcet winner.
Statement
theorem condorcet_winner_not_of_majority_defeated {V A : Type*} [Fintype V] (P : V → A → A → Prop) [∀ v, DecidableRel (P v)] (x y : A) (h_defeat : (Finset.filter (fun v => P v y x) Finset.univ).card > (Finset.filter (fun v => P v x y) Finset.univ).card) : ¬ condorcet_winner P x
- Formalizes
- standard textbook observation (social choice: a Condorcet winner is not beaten by a strict pairwise majority)
- Verified
- 06 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 1
- condorcet_winnerIn a profile of preferences P where a finite set of voters V have pairwise preferences over alternatives A, an alternative x : A is a…
Read back from the Lean
Given a finite type V, a type A, a family of decidable binary relations P : V → A → A → Prop, and elements x, y : A, if the number of voters v : V for which P v y x holds is strictly greater than the number of voters v : V for which P v x y holds, then x is not a Condorcet winner with respect to P.
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
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/-- An alternative that is strictly defeated in pairwise majority comparison cannot be a Condorcet winner. -/theorem condorcet_winner_not_of_majority_defeated {V A : Type*} [Fintype V] (P : V → A → A → Prop) [∀ v, DecidableRel (P v)] (x y : A) (h_defeat : (Finset.filter (fun v => P v y x) Finset.univ).card > (Finset.filter (fun v => P v x y) Finset.univ).card) : ¬ condorcet_winner P x := by intro hx by_cases h : y = x · subst h omega · have h1 := hx y h omega