AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

condorcet_winner_not_of_majority_defeated

theoremverifiedformalization

If an alternative y is strictly preferred to alternative x by more voters than prefer x to y, then x cannot be a Condorcet winner.

Statement

theorem condorcet_winner_not_of_majority_defeated {V A : Type*} [Fintype V]
    (P : V → A → A → Prop) [∀ v, DecidableRel (P v)] (x y : A)
    (h_defeat : (Finset.filter (fun v => P v y x) Finset.univ).card >
                (Finset.filter (fun v => P v x y) Finset.univ).card) :
    ¬ condorcet_winner P x
Formalizes
standard textbook observation (social choice: a Condorcet winner is not beaten by a strict pairwise majority)
Verified
06 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 1
  • condorcet_winnerIn a profile of preferences P where a finite set of voters V have pairwise preferences over alternatives A, an alternative x : A is a…

Read back from the Lean

Given a finite type V, a type A, a family of decidable binary relations P : V → A → A → Prop, and elements x, y : A, if the number of voters v : V for which P v y x holds is strictly greater than the number of voters v : V for which P v x y holds, then x is not a Condorcet winner with respect to P.

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- An alternative that is strictly defeated in pairwise majority comparison cannot be a Condorcet winner. -/theorem condorcet_winner_not_of_majority_defeated {V A : Type*} [Fintype V]    (P : V → A → A → Prop) [∀ v, DecidableRel (P v)] (x y : A)    (h_defeat : (Finset.filter (fun v => P v y x) Finset.univ).card >                (Finset.filter (fun v => P v x y) Finset.univ).card) :    ¬ condorcet_winner P x := by  intro hx  by_cases h : y = x  · subst h    omega  · have h1 := hx y h    omega
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