condorcet_winner_of_subsingleton
theoremverifiedoriginal
When the set of alternatives is a subsingleton, any alternative is a Condorcet winner under any preference profile.
Statement
theorem condorcet_winner_of_subsingleton {V A : Type*} [Fintype V] (P : V → A → A → Prop) [∀ v, DecidableRel (P v)] [Subsingleton A] (x : A) : condorcet_winner P x
- Related work
- machine-posed degenerate case of the Condorcet-winner definition (at most one alternative); trivial, no novelty claimed
- Verified
- 06 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 1
- condorcet_winnerIn a profile of preferences P where a finite set of voters V have pairwise preferences over alternatives A, an alternative x : A is a…
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
/-- In a single-alternative setting, the unique alternative is vacuously a Condorcet winner. -/theorem condorcet_winner_of_subsingleton {V A : Type*} [Fintype V] (P : V → A → A → Prop) [∀ v, DecidableRel (P v)] [Subsingleton A] (x : A) : condorcet_winner P x := by intro y hy exfalso exact hy (Subsingleton.elim y x)