dsic_of_constant_mechanism
theoremverifiedoriginal
A constant direct mechanism, which chooses a fixed allocation and charges a fixed payment regardless of reports, is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible for any valuation function.
Statement
theorem dsic_of_constant_mechanism {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player] {Theta : Player → Type*} {Outcome : Type*} (c_alloc : Outcome) (c_pay : ℝ) (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ) : is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible ⟨fun _ => c_alloc, fun _ _ => c_pay⟩ v
- Related work
- machine-posed degenerate case of DSIC (constant mechanism); trivial, folklore in mechanism design, no novelty claimed
- Verified
- 06 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- DirectMechanismA direct mechanism with player type Player, type spaces Theta i for each player i : Player, and outcome type Outcome, consists of an…
- is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatibleFor a direct mechanism (M : DirectMechanism Player Theta Outcome) with {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player], {Theta : Player → Type*},…
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/-- A constant direct mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible for any valuation profile. -/theorem dsic_of_constant_mechanism {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player] {Theta : Player → Type*} {Outcome : Type*} (c_alloc : Outcome) (c_pay : ℝ) (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ) : is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible ⟨fun _ => c_alloc, fun _ _ => c_pay⟩ v := by intro i θ θ_i' dsimp [is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible] linarith