AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

dsic_of_constant_mechanism

theoremverifiedoriginal

A constant direct mechanism, which chooses a fixed allocation and charges a fixed payment regardless of reports, is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible for any valuation function.

Statement

theorem dsic_of_constant_mechanism {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player]
    {Theta : Player → Type*} {Outcome : Type*}
    (c_alloc : Outcome) (c_pay : ℝ)
    (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ) :
    is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible
      ⟨fun _ => c_alloc, fun _ _ => c_pay⟩ v
Related work
machine-posed degenerate case of DSIC (constant mechanism); trivial, folklore in mechanism design, no novelty claimed
Verified
06 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 2
  • DirectMechanismA direct mechanism with player type Player, type spaces Theta i for each player i : Player, and outcome type Outcome, consists of an…
  • is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatibleFor a direct mechanism (M : DirectMechanism Player Theta Outcome) with {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player], {Theta : Player → Type*},…

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- A constant direct mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible for any valuation profile. -/theorem dsic_of_constant_mechanism {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player]    {Theta : Player → Type*} {Outcome : Type*}    (c_alloc : Outcome) (c_pay : ℝ)    (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ) :    is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible      ⟨fun _ => c_alloc, fun _ _ => c_pay⟩ v := by  intro i θ θ_i'  dsimp [is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible]  linarith
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