AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

first_welfare_theorem_weak

theoremverifiedformalization

In a pure exchange economy E with finite, nonempty agent type Agent and finite commodity type Good, if price vector p : Good → ℝ has non-negative prices (∀ g, 0 ≤ p g) and allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ forms a Walrasian equilibrium at prices p, then x is weakly Pareto optimal in E.

Statement

theorem first_welfare_theorem_weak
    {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] [Nonempty Agent]
    (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ)
    (hp : ∀ g, 0 ≤ p g)
    (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x) :
    is_weakly_pareto_optimal E x
Formalizes
Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, Microeconomic Theory, Proposition 16.C.1; Arrow & Debreu 1954
Verified
01 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 3
  • is_walrasian_equilibriumIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite commodities Good, a price vector p : Good → ℝ and an allocation x : Agent…
  • is_weakly_pareto_optimalIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent, an allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ is weakly Pareto optimal if x is feasible in E…
  • ExchangeEconomyA pure exchange economy with agent type Agent and commodity type Good consists of a non-negative initial endowment of each good for each…

Read back from the Lean

For any finite types Agent and Good, where Agent is nonempty, any exchange economy E with agents Agent and goods Good, any price vector p : Good → ℝ, and any allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ: if 1. p is non-negative for all goods (i.e., ∀ g, 0 ≤ p g), and 2. (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium for E, then x is weakly Pareto optimal in E.

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics (weak form): any Walrasian equilibrium allocation with non-negative prices is weakly Pareto optimal. -/theorem first_welfare_theorem_weak    {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] [Nonempty Agent]    (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ)    (hp : ∀ g, 0 ≤ p g)    (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x) :    is_weakly_pareto_optimal E x := by  constructor  · exact h_walras.1  · rintro ⟨y, hy_feas, hy_better⟩    have h_budget_lt : ∀ i : Agent, ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ g, p g * y i g := by      intro i      by_contra! hle      have h_le_utility := (h_walras.2 i).2 (y i) (hy_feas.1 i) hle      have h_lt_utility := hy_better i      exact lt_irrefl _ (h_lt_utility.trans_le h_le_utility)    have h_sum_lt : ∑ i, ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ i, ∑ g, p g * y i g := by      apply Finset.sum_lt_sum_of_nonempty Finset.univ_nonempty      intro i _      exact h_budget_lt i    rw [Finset.sum_comm] at h_sum_lt    have h_comm_right : ∑ i, ∑ g, p g * y i g = ∑ g, ∑ i, p g * y i g := Finset.sum_comm    rw [h_comm_right] at h_sum_lt    have h_endow_eq : (∑ g, ∑ i, p g * E.endowment i g) = ∑ g, p g * ∑ i, E.endowment i g := by      refine Finset.sum_congr rfl fun g _ => ?_      rw [Finset.mul_sum]    have h_y_eq : (∑ g, ∑ i, p g * y i g) = ∑ g, p g * ∑ i, y i g := by      refine Finset.sum_congr rfl fun g _ => ?_      rw [Finset.mul_sum]    rw [h_endow_eq, h_y_eq] at h_sum_lt    have h_sum_le : ∑ g, p g * ∑ i, y i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * ∑ i, E.endowment i g := by      apply Finset.sum_le_sum      intro g _      exact mul_le_mul_of_nonneg_left (hy_feas.2 g) (hp g)    exact lt_irrefl _ (h_sum_lt.trans_le h_sum_le)
See it in the graphDiscuss this resultChallenge it