first_welfare_theorem_weak
In a pure exchange economy E with finite, nonempty agent type Agent and finite commodity type Good, if price vector p : Good → ℝ has non-negative prices (∀ g, 0 ≤ p g) and allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ forms a Walrasian equilibrium at prices p, then x is weakly Pareto optimal in E.
Statement
theorem first_welfare_theorem_weak {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] [Nonempty Agent] (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ) (hp : ∀ g, 0 ≤ p g) (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x) : is_weakly_pareto_optimal E x
- Formalizes
- Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, Microeconomic Theory, Proposition 16.C.1; Arrow & Debreu 1954
- Verified
- 01 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 3
- is_walrasian_equilibriumIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite commodities Good, a price vector p : Good → ℝ and an allocation x : Agent…
- is_weakly_pareto_optimalIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent, an allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ is weakly Pareto optimal if x is feasible in E…
- ExchangeEconomyA pure exchange economy with agent type Agent and commodity type Good consists of a non-negative initial endowment of each good for each…
Read back from the Lean
For any finite types Agent and Good, where Agent is nonempty, any exchange economy E with agents Agent and goods Good, any price vector p : Good → ℝ, and any allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ:
if
1. p is non-negative for all goods (i.e., ∀ g, 0 ≤ p g), and
2. (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium for E,
then x is weakly Pareto optimal in E.
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/-- First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics (weak form): any Walrasian equilibrium allocation with non-negative prices is weakly Pareto optimal. -/theorem first_welfare_theorem_weak {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] [Nonempty Agent] (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ) (hp : ∀ g, 0 ≤ p g) (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x) : is_weakly_pareto_optimal E x := by constructor · exact h_walras.1 · rintro ⟨y, hy_feas, hy_better⟩ have h_budget_lt : ∀ i : Agent, ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ g, p g * y i g := by intro i by_contra! hle have h_le_utility := (h_walras.2 i).2 (y i) (hy_feas.1 i) hle have h_lt_utility := hy_better i exact lt_irrefl _ (h_lt_utility.trans_le h_le_utility) have h_sum_lt : ∑ i, ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ i, ∑ g, p g * y i g := by apply Finset.sum_lt_sum_of_nonempty Finset.univ_nonempty intro i _ exact h_budget_lt i rw [Finset.sum_comm] at h_sum_lt have h_comm_right : ∑ i, ∑ g, p g * y i g = ∑ g, ∑ i, p g * y i g := Finset.sum_comm rw [h_comm_right] at h_sum_lt have h_endow_eq : (∑ g, ∑ i, p g * E.endowment i g) = ∑ g, p g * ∑ i, E.endowment i g := by refine Finset.sum_congr rfl fun g _ => ?_ rw [Finset.mul_sum] have h_y_eq : (∑ g, ∑ i, p g * y i g) = ∑ g, p g * ∑ i, y i g := by refine Finset.sum_congr rfl fun g _ => ?_ rw [Finset.mul_sum] rw [h_endow_eq, h_y_eq] at h_sum_lt have h_sum_le : ∑ g, p g * ∑ i, y i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * ∑ i, E.endowment i g := by apply Finset.sum_le_sum intro g _ exact mul_le_mul_of_nonneg_left (hy_feas.2 g) (hp g) exact lt_irrefl _ (h_sum_lt.trans_le h_sum_le)