is_walrasian_equilibrium
In a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite commodities Good, a price vector p : Good → ℝ and an allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ form a Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium if x is feasible in E, each agent's bundle x i satisfies the budget constraint ∑ g, p g * x i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g, and for every agent i, any non-negative bundle y : Good → ℝ satisfying the budget constraint ∑ g, p g * y g ≤ ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g satisfies E.utility i y ≤ E.utility i (x i).
Statement
def is_walrasian_equilibrium {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, Microeconomic Theory (1995), Definition 15.B.2 and Definition 16.C.1.
- Verified
- 01 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- ExchangeEconomyA pure exchange economy with agent type Agent and commodity type Good consists of a non-negative initial endowment of each good for each…
- is_feasible_allocationIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent, an allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ is feasible if every agent receives a…
- Used by 5
- first_welfare_theoremThe First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: in a pure exchange economy E with finite, nonempty agent type Agent and finite,…
- walrasian_expenditure_gt_of_utility_gtIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite commodities Good, if (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then for any…
- first_welfare_theorem_weakIn a pure exchange economy E with finite, nonempty agent type Agent and finite commodity type Good, if price vector p : Good → ℝ has…
- walrasian_expenditure_ge_of_utility_geIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite, nonempty commodity type Good, if price vector p has strictly positive…
- walrasian_budget_exhaustionIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite, nonempty commodity type Good, if price vector p has strictly positive…
Read back from the Lean
For finite types Agent and Good, an exchange economy E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good, a price vector p : Good → ℝ, and an allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ, is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x asserts that:
1. x is a feasible allocation in E:
- For every agent i and good g, x i g ≥ 0.
- For every good g, the aggregate consumption $\sum_{i} x(i, g)$ is at most the aggregate endowment $\sum_{i} E.\text{endowment}(i, g)$.
2. For every agent i:
- Agent i satisfies their budget constraint: the expenditure $\sum_{g} p(g) \cdot x(i, g)$ is at most the wealth $\sum_{g} p(g) \cdot E.\text{endowment}(i, g)$.
- Agent i maximizes utility subject to their budget constraint: for every bundle y : Good → ℝ, if $y(g) \ge 0$ for all goods $g$ and $\sum_{g} p(g) \cdot y(g) \le \sum_{g} p(g) \cdot E.\text{endowment}(i, g)$, then $E.\text{utility}(i, y) \le E.\text{utility}(i, x(i))$.
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- A price vector `p` and allocation `x` constitute a Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium if `x` is feasible, each agent's bundle is affordable, and each agent maximizes utility over all affordable non-negative bundles. -/ def is_walrasian_equilibrium {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ) : Prop := is_feasible_allocation E x ∧ (∀ i, (∑ g, p g * x i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g) ∧ ∀ y : Good → ℝ, (∀ g, 0 ≤ y g) → (∑ g, p g * y g ≤ ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g) → E.utility i y ≤ E.utility i (x i))