fse_Anonymous
def
Anonymity: permuting the agents' labels does not change the outcome.
Statement
def fse_Anonymous {n : ℕ} (f : (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- Facility Location Games with Scaling Effects (arXiv:2402.18908v3), Section 2, Theorem 4 and the concluding conjecture that the deterministic strategyproof and surjective mechanisms under scaled preferences are dictatorships; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-05
- Verified
- 05 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 3
- fse_leftmost_anonymousThe leftmost mechanism is anonymous.
- fse_conjecture_false_qdepRefutation in the model with the scaling function as input. The mechanism fse_F (which receives q) is strategyproof and surjective for…
- fse_dictatorship_conjecture_falseRefutation of the dictatorship conjecture of arXiv 2402.18908 (Section 8). For every number n ≥ 2 of agents there is a scaling function…
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- Anonymity: permuting the agents' labels does not change the outcome. -/ def fse_Anonymous {n : ℕ} (f : (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ) : Prop := ∀ (σ : Equiv.Perm (Fin n)) (x : Fin n → ℝ), f (x ∘ σ) = f x