fse_Surjective
def
Surjectivity (onto [0,1]).
Statement
def fse_Surjective {n : ℕ} (f : (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- Facility Location Games with Scaling Effects (arXiv:2402.18908v3), Section 2, Theorem 4 and the concluding conjecture that the deterministic strategyproof and surjective mechanisms under scaled preferences are dictatorships; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-05
- Verified
- 05 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- fse_InDomainA location profile of n agents lies in the domain [0,1].
- Used by 6
- fse_leftmost_surjectiveThe leftmost mechanism is surjective onto [0,1] (unanimous profiles).
- fse_conjecture_false_qdepRefutation in the model with the scaling function as input. The mechanism fse_F (which receives q) is strategyproof and surjective for…
- fse_mem_rangeA surjective mechanism that is strategyproof for all scaling functions always outputs some agent's reported location.
- fse_scaling_oblivious_dictatorshipThe dictatorship conjecture holds for scaling-oblivious mechanisms. If a mechanism into [0,1] does not depend on the scaling function and…
- fse_dictatorship_conjecture_falseRefutation of the dictatorship conjecture of arXiv 2402.18908 (Section 8). For every number n ≥ 2 of agents there is a scaling function…
- fse_followMoving the coordinate of agent i when i's location is not shared and the outcome is at i's location: the outcome follows agent i.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- Surjectivity (onto `[0,1]`). -/ def fse_Surjective {n : ℕ} (f : (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ) : Prop := ∀ y ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1, ∃ x : Fin n → ℝ, fse_InDomain x ∧ f x = y