fse_SinglePeaked
def
The (weak) single-peakedness of the preference of an agent at x under scaling q: the cost does not decrease when the facility moves away from x on either side.
Statement
def fse_SinglePeaked (q : ℝ → ℝ) (x : ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- Facility Location Games with Scaling Effects (arXiv:2402.18908v3), Section 2, Theorem 4 and the concluding conjecture that the deterministic strategyproof and surjective mechanisms under scaled preferences are dictatorships; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-05
- Verified
- 05 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- fse_costFacility location with scaling effects (arXiv 2402.18908): an agent located at x incurs cost q y * |x - y| when the facility is placed at…
- Used by 3
- fse_conjecture_false_qdepRefutation in the model with the scaling function as input. The mechanism fse_F (which receives q) is strategyproof and surjective for…
- fse_dictatorship_conjecture_falseRefutation of the dictatorship conjecture of arXiv 2402.18908 (Section 8). For every number n ≥ 2 of agents there is a scaling function…
- fse_q0_not_singlePeakedUnder q0, the preference of the agent located at 0 is not single-peaked: the facility at 1/2 costs her 11/40, but the farther location 1…
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- The (weak) single-peakedness of the preference of an agent at `x` under scaling `q`: the cost does not decrease when the facility moves away from `x` on either side. -/ def fse_SinglePeaked (q : ℝ → ℝ) (x : ℝ) : Prop := ∀ y y' : ℝ, y ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1 → y' ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1 → ((x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ y') ∨ (y' ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x)) → fse_cost q y x ≤ fse_cost q y' x