fse_cost
def
Facility location with scaling effects (arXiv 2402.18908): an agent located at x incurs cost q y * |x - y| when the facility is placed at y, where q is the (public) scaling function.
Statement
noncomputable def fse_cost (q : ℝ → ℝ) (y x : ℝ) : ℝ
- Defined in
- Facility Location Games with Scaling Effects (arXiv:2402.18908v3), Section 2, Theorem 4 and the concluding conjecture that the deterministic strategyproof and surjective mechanisms under scaled preferences are dictatorships; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-05
- Verified
- 05 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 6
- fse_SinglePeakedThe (weak) single-peakedness of the preference of an agent at x under scaling q: the cost does not decrease when the facility moves away…
- fse_leftmost_SP_of_antitoneKey lemma: for every scaling function that is non-negative and non-increasing on [0,1], the leftmost mechanism is strategyproof.
- fse_q0_not_singlePeakedUnder q0, the preference of the agent located at 0 is not single-peaked: the facility at 1/2 costs her 11/40, but the farther location 1…
- fse_SPStrategyproofness for the scaling function q: no agent can lower her scaled cost by misreporting her location (any misreport in [0,1]).
- fse_dictator_SPA dictatorship is strategyproof for every non-negative scaling function.
- fse_lemmaCKey consequence of strategyproofness for all scaling functions: a unilateral deviation can change the outcome only if the outcome was at…
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- Facility location with scaling effects (arXiv 2402.18908): an agent located at `x` incurs cost `q y * |x - y|` when the facility is placed at `y`, where `q` is the (public) scaling function. -/ noncomputable def fse_cost (q : ℝ → ℝ) (y x : ℝ) : ℝ := q y * |x - y|