holdinv_finalState
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
holdinv_finalState
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open List Finset in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} [NeZero n] in lemma holdinv_finalState (w m : Preferences n) : HoldInv m (finalState w m)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `holdinv_finalState`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.holdinv_finalState← holdinv_finalState (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/GaleShapley.lean:920): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 6
- holdinv_runholdinv_run
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - HoldInvHoldInv (Held → Proposed): if woman
pcurrently holds manj, thenjmust already have proposed top— i.e.,pis in the… - GS.finalState
finalState: rundaRunwith fueln*n + 1frominitState. - GS.initStateInitial state: all women free, all men start at proposal index 0.
- holdinv_initholdinv_init
- Used by 2
- galeShapley_isStableGale-Shapley stability: the DA output has no blocking pair. The statement is in the *market* frame (
IsBlocking … (i : M) (j : W)).… - GS.galeShapley_isProposingOptimalMen-optimal stable matching (Gale–Shapley 1962, [MSZ 22.10]): in the men-proposing DA, every man's GS partner is at least as preferred…
- galeShapley_isStableGale-Shapley stability: the DA output has no blocking pair. The statement is in the *market* frame (
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open List Finset in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} [NeZero n] in lemma holdinv_finalState (w m : Preferences n) : HoldInv m (finalState w m) := holdinv_run w m (n * n + 1) (initState n) (holdinv_init m)