galeShapley_isStable
Gale-Shapley stability: the DA output has no blocking pair. The statement is in the *market* frame (IsBlocking … (i : M) (j : W)). But MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m transposes the two sides (see its docstring), so the market-M index i is an algorithm *woman* and the market-W index j is an algorithm *man*. The proof therefore reads in the algorithm frame — i a woman, j a man — matching the inline comments. Proof (standard deferred acceptance): suppose (i, j) blocks. In algorithm terms man j strictly prefers woman i to his wife, so j proposed to i at some round: his wife is in his proposed-prefix (holdinv_finalState) and i is ranked at least as early (hprefJ). Then rsinv_stability (RSInv) gives that at termination woman i holds a man she ranks at least as high as j, so she does *not* strictly prefer j to her partner — contradicting the blocking assumption.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open List Finset in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} [NeZero n] in variable (w m : Preferences n) in theorem galeShapley_isStable : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) (Matching.ofGS (gs w m) (gs_bijective w m))
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `galeShapley_isStable`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.galeShapley_isStable← galeShapley_isStable (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/GaleShapley.lean:1072): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 19
- rsinv_stabilityIf j strictly prefers i over his final partner, i's final partner has rank ≤ j.
- final_all_women_holdAt termination, every woman holds some man.
- holdinv_finalStateholdinv_finalState
- gs_bijective
gs w mis a bijection onFin n. - GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - Matching.ofGSCoerce a bijective
f : Fin n → Fin nintoMatching (Fin n) (Fin n). - GS.gsThe Gale-Shapley function: woman
j's partner at termination. - Matching.IsBlockingA pair
(m, w)is a blocking pair for matchingμif bothmandwstrictly prefer each other to their current partners. [MSZ 22.5] - GS.DAStateDA state: per-man proposal cursor + per-woman tentative hold.
- GS.finalState
finalState: rundaRunwith fueln*n + 1frominitState. - GS.pref_list_memEvery element of
Fin nappears in a full-permutation list. - strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market.
MandWare the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference… - MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
- IsPreferenceA weak preference relation is admissible if it is reflexive, transitive, and total.
- Used by 2
- GS.StableMatching.gsStableThe men-proposing Gale–Shapley output, as an element of the lattice of stable matchings.
- GS.gs_partner_isAchievableThe GS output itself witnesses that
gs.symm jis achievable forj.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen List Finset inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} [NeZero n] invariable (w m : Preferences n) in/-- **Gale-Shapley stability**: the DA output has no blocking pair. The statement is in the *market* frame (`IsBlocking … (i : M) (j : W)`). But `MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m` **transposes the two sides** (see its docstring), so the market-`M` index `i` is an algorithm *woman* and the market-`W` index `j` is an algorithm *man*. The proof therefore reads in the algorithm frame — `i` a woman, `j` a man — matching the inline comments. Proof (standard deferred acceptance): suppose `(i, j)` blocks. In algorithm terms man `j` strictly prefers woman `i` to his wife, so `j` proposed to `i` at some round: his wife is in his proposed-prefix (`holdinv_finalState`) and `i` is ranked at least as early (`hprefJ`). Then `rsinv_stability` (`RSInv`) gives that at termination woman `i` holds a man she ranks at least as high as `j`, so she does *not* strictly prefer `j` to her partner — contradicting the blocking assumption. -/theorem galeShapley_isStable : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) (Matching.ofGS (gs w m) (gs_bijective w m)) := by intro i j simp only [Matching.IsBlocking, Matching.ofGS, MatchingMarket.ofEquivData, strict, not_and] intro hprefI hprefJ -- After the simp+intros, the context is: -- hprefI : woman i strictly prefers man j to her current husband gs w m i -- (= idxOf j (w.prefs i) ≤ idxOf (gs w m i) ∧ ¬ converse) -- hprefJ : man j weakly prefers woman i to his current wife (gs w m).symm j -- (the "≤" half of strict; the "¬ ≤" half is the goal to refute, i.e. the -- goal is `¬¬ idxOf (gs w m).symm j ≤ idxOf i`, equivalent to `≤`). -- Strategy (Roth–Sotomayor): show woman i is in j's already-proposed prefix, so -- by `rsinv_stability` she'd already be holding someone she prefers at least as -- much as j — contradicting `hprefI`'s strict preference for j over her husband. obtain ⟨_, hI_strict⟩ := hprefI rw [not_le] at hI_strict -- hI_strict : idxOf j (w.prefs i) < idxOf (gs w m i) (w.prefs i) -- Step 1. Identify j's wife — the woman matched with j by `gs`. set wife : Fin n := (Equiv.ofBijective (gs w m) (gs_bijective w m)).symm j with wife_def have hwife_apply : gs w m wife = j := (Equiv.ofBijective (gs w m) (gs_bijective w m)).apply_symm_apply j -- Step 2. `wife` actually holds `j` in `finalState` — follow `gs`'s definition. have hwife_holds : (finalState w m).holding wife = some j := by obtain ⟨h, hh⟩ := final_all_women_hold w m wife have hgs : gs w m wife = h := by simp [gs, hh] rw [hgs] at hwife_apply exact hwife_apply ▸ hh -- Step 3. By `HoldInv` at `finalState`, the wife is in j's already-proposed prefix. have hwife_in : wife ∈ (m.prefs j).take ((finalState w m).nextChoice j) := holdinv_finalState w m j wife hwife_holds have hj_prefs_mem : ∀ x : Fin n, x ∈ m.prefs j := pref_list_mem _ (m.valid j).1 (m.valid j).2 have hwife_lt : (m.prefs j).idxOf wife < (finalState w m).nextChoice j := (List.mem_take_iff_idxOf_lt (hj_prefs_mem wife)).mp hwife_in -- Step 4. By `hprefJ` (j weakly prefers i to wife), `i` is at least as early as -- wife in `m.prefs j`, so also in the proposed prefix. have hi_lt : (m.prefs j).idxOf i < (finalState w m).nextChoice j := lt_of_le_of_lt hprefJ hwife_lt -- Step 5. `rsinv_stability` then says i's husband is *at least* as preferred -- (by i) as j — directly contradicting i's strict preference for j. exact absurd (rsinv_stability w m j i hi_lt) (not_le.mpr hI_strict)