is_dominant_strategy_equilibrium
A strategy profile s : (i : Player) → Theta i → Message i is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of mechanism M under valuation profile v if for every player i, true type θ_i : Theta i, message profile m : ∀ j, Message j, and alternative message m_i' : Message i, playing s i θ_i yields weakly higher utility than playing m_i': v i θ_i (M.allocation (Function.update m i m_i')) - M.payment i (Function.update m i m_i') ≤ v i θ_i (M.allocation (Function.update m i (s i θ_i))) - M.payment i (Function.update m i (s i θ_i)).
Statement
def is_dominant_strategy_equilibrium {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player] {Message : Player → Type*} {Theta : Player → Type*} {Outcome : Type*} (M : DirectMechanism Player Message Outcome) (s : (i : Player) → Theta i → Message i) (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- Tilman Borgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, Section 2.2
- Verified
- 01 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- DirectMechanismA direct mechanism with player type Player, type spaces Theta i for each player i : Player, and outcome type Outcome, consists of an…
- Used by 2
- revelation_principle_dominant_strategyThe Revelation Principle for dominant-strategy equilibrium: if s is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of mechanism M with respect to…
- dsic_iff_truthful_dominant_strategyFor any direct mechanism M and valuation profile v, truthful reporting (the identity strategy profile fun _ => id) is a dominant-strategy…
Read back from the Lean
For a mechanism M (with allocation rule M.allocation : (∀ j, Message j) → Outcome and payment rule M.payment : Player → (∀ j, Message j) → ℝ), a strategy profile s : (i : Player) → Theta i → Message i, and a valuation function v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ, s is a dominant strategy equilibrium if:
For every player i : Player, every type θ_i : Theta i, every profile of messages m : ∀ j, Message j, and every alternative message m_i' : Message i,
player i's quasi-linear utility from reporting m_i' (with other players' messages given by m):
v i θ_i (M.allocation (Function.update m i m_i')) - M.payment i (Function.update m i m_i')
is less than or equal to player i's quasi-linear utility from reporting s i θ_i (with other players' messages given by m):
v i θ_i (M.allocation (Function.update m i (s i θ_i))) - M.payment i (Function.update m i (s i θ_i)).
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- A strategy profile s is a dominant-strategy equilibrium if reporting according to s yields weakly higher utility than any deviating message, against any message profile. -/ def is_dominant_strategy_equilibrium {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player] {Message : Player → Type*} {Theta : Player → Type*} {Outcome : Type*} (M : DirectMechanism Player Message Outcome) (s : (i : Player) → Theta i → Message i) (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ) : Prop := ∀ (i : Player) (θ_i : Theta i) (m : ∀ j, Message j) (m_i' : Message i), v i θ_i (M.allocation (Function.update m i m_i')) - M.payment i (Function.update m i m_i') ≤ v i θ_i (M.allocation (Function.update m i (s i θ_i))) - M.payment i (Function.update m i (s i θ_i))