AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

is_dominant_strategy_equilibrium

def

A strategy profile s : (i : Player) → Theta i → Message i is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of mechanism M under valuation profile v if for every player i, true type θ_i : Theta i, message profile m : ∀ j, Message j, and alternative message m_i' : Message i, playing s i θ_i yields weakly higher utility than playing m_i': v i θ_i (M.allocation (Function.update m i m_i')) - M.payment i (Function.update m i m_i') ≤ v i θ_i (M.allocation (Function.update m i (s i θ_i))) - M.payment i (Function.update m i (s i θ_i)).

Statement

def is_dominant_strategy_equilibrium
    {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player]
    {Message : Player → Type*} {Theta : Player → Type*} {Outcome : Type*}
    (M : DirectMechanism Player Message Outcome)
    (s : (i : Player) → Theta i → Message i)
    (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ) : Prop
Defined in
Tilman Borgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, Section 2.2
Verified
01 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • DirectMechanismA direct mechanism with player type Player, type spaces Theta i for each player i : Player, and outcome type Outcome, consists of an…
Used by 2

Read back from the Lean

For a mechanism M (with allocation rule M.allocation : (∀ j, Message j) → Outcome and payment rule M.payment : Player → (∀ j, Message j) → ℝ), a strategy profile s : (i : Player) → Theta i → Message i, and a valuation function v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ, s is a dominant strategy equilibrium if: For every player i : Player, every type θ_i : Theta i, every profile of messages m : ∀ j, Message j, and every alternative message m_i' : Message i, player i's quasi-linear utility from reporting m_i' (with other players' messages given by m): v i θ_i (M.allocation (Function.update m i m_i')) - M.payment i (Function.update m i m_i') is less than or equal to player i's quasi-linear utility from reporting s i θ_i (with other players' messages given by m): v i θ_i (M.allocation (Function.update m i (s i θ_i))) - M.payment i (Function.update m i (s i θ_i)).

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- A strategy profile s is a dominant-strategy equilibrium if reporting according to s yields weakly higher utility than any deviating message, against any message profile. -/
def is_dominant_strategy_equilibrium
    {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player]
    {Message : Player → Type*} {Theta : Player → Type*} {Outcome : Type*}
    (M : DirectMechanism Player Message Outcome)
    (s : (i : Player) → Theta i → Message i)
    (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ) : Prop := ∀ (i : Player) (θ_i : Theta i) (m : ∀ j, Message j) (m_i' : Message i),
    v i θ_i (M.allocation (Function.update m i m_i')) - M.payment i (Function.update m i m_i') ≤
    v i θ_i (M.allocation (Function.update m i (s i θ_i))) - M.payment i (Function.update m i (s i θ_i))
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