dsic_iff_truthful_dominant_strategy
For any direct mechanism M and valuation profile v, truthful reporting (the identity strategy profile fun _ => id) is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of M if and only if M is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible.
Statement
theorem dsic_iff_truthful_dominant_strategy {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player] {Theta : Player → Type*} {Outcome : Type*} (M : DirectMechanism Player Theta Outcome) (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ) : is_dominant_strategy_equilibrium M (fun _ => id) v ↔ is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible M v
- Formalizes
- Tilman Borgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, Section 2.3
- Verified
- 01 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 4
- DirectMechanismA direct mechanism with player type Player, type spaces Theta i for each player i : Player, and outcome type Outcome, consists of an…
- is_dominant_strategy_equilibriumA strategy profile s : (i : Player) → Theta i → Message i is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of mechanism M under valuation profile v if…
- is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatibleFor a direct mechanism (M : DirectMechanism Player Theta Outcome) with {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player], {Theta : Player → Type*},…
- revelation_principle_dominant_strategyThe Revelation Principle for dominant-strategy equilibrium: if s is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of mechanism M with respect to…
Read back from the Lean
Given a type of players Player with decidable equality, a family of type spaces Theta : Player → Type*, an outcome type Outcome, a direct mechanism M (consisting of an allocation rule M.allocation : (∀ i, Theta i) → Outcome and a payment rule M.payment : Player → (∀ i, Theta i) → ℝ), and a valuation function v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ:
The truthful strategy profile fun _ => id (where every player reports their true type) is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of M with respect to v if and only if M is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) with respect to v.
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/-- A direct mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible if and only if truthful reporting is a dominant-strategy equilibrium. -/theorem dsic_iff_truthful_dominant_strategy {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player] {Theta : Player → Type*} {Outcome : Type*} (M : DirectMechanism Player Theta Outcome) (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ) : is_dominant_strategy_equilibrium M (fun _ => id) v ↔ is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible M v := by constructor · intro h i θ θ_i' have h1 := h i (θ i) θ θ_i' dsimp at h1 rw [Function.update_eq_self] at h1 exact h1 · intro h i θ_i m m_i' have h1 := h i (Function.update m i θ_i) m_i' rw [Function.update_self] at h1 rw [Function.update_idem] at h1 exact h1