is_obedient_direct_scheme
def
An obedient direct scheme for the prior μ on {0,1}^ι.
Statement
open Finset in def is_obedient_direct_scheme {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (μ : (ι → Bool) → ℝ) (q : (ι → Bool) → (ι → Bool) → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- Quantifying Theoretical AI Alignment Guarantees: Receiver-Utility Bounds in Bayesian Persuasion, arXiv:2606.22226 v1, Sec. 3 (bit-string model, direct obedient form, R_0, S*, R_max); formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-03
- Verified
- 03 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- persuasion_obedience_costObedience cost C_i(x, a): 1/2 - x_i if a_i = 1, x_i - 1/2 if a_i = 0.
- Used by 7
- persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_leFor every finite type ι and every prior μ on ι → Bool that is uniform on 2 distinct states, the maximum receiver utility R_max(μ) is at…
- persuasion_receiver_add_sender_leSender–receiver trade-off (Lemma 4.2). R(q) + S(q) ≤ n + ∑_i p_i(μ).
- persuasion_slice_scheme_obedientThe slice scheme (pair the realised state with a uniformly random other state and recommend the coordinatewise OR) is an obedient direct…
- persuasion_pair_or_scheme_obedientThe pair-OR scheme of a nonnegative symmetric coupling with first marginal μ is obedient.
- bit_persuasion_even_scheme_obedientFor every natural number m ≥ 1, bit_persuasion_even_scheme m is an obedient direct scheme for bit_persuasion_even_prior m…
- is_sender_optimal_schemeq is obedient and maximises the sender's utility among obedient schemes.
- persuasion_slice_sender_leSender value of the slice prior. No obedient scheme gives the sender more than C(2m+1,m) - C(2m-1,m).
Lean source view module on GitHub
open Finset in /-- An obedient direct scheme for the prior `μ` on `{0,1}^ι`. -/ def is_obedient_direct_scheme {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (μ : (ι → Bool) → ℝ) (q : (ι → Bool) → (ι → Bool) → ℝ) : Prop := (∀ x a, 0 ≤ q x a) ∧ (∀ x, ∑ a, q x a = μ x) ∧ ∀ a i, ∑ x, q x a * persuasion_obedience_cost i x a ≤ 0