AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le

theoremverified

For every finite type ι and every prior μ on ι → Bool that is uniform on 2 distinct states, the maximum receiver utility R_max(μ) is at most the prior utility R_0(μ).

Statement

open Finset in
theorem persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le
    (ι : Type) [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (μ : (ι → Bool) → ℝ)
    (hμ : is_uniform_bit_prior 2 μ) :
    persuasion_max_receiver_utility μ ≤ persuasion_prior_utility μ
Source
arXiv:2606.22226
Verified
12 Nov 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 14

Read back from the Lean

For any finite type ι with decidable equality, and any function μ : (ι → Bool) → ℝ, if μ is a uniform prior supported on exactly 2 states (meaning μ is a non-negative function summing to 1 whose support {x | μ x ≠ 0} has cardinality 2, and μ x = 1/2 for each state in the support), then the maximum receiver utility under sender-optimal persuasion schemes for μ is less than or equal to the prior utility under μ.

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

The proof, explained

To show that the maximum receiver utility does not exceed the prior utility when the prior is uniform on two states a and b, we construct an obedient pair-OR scheme from a symmetric coupling on {a, b}. Any sender-optimal scheme achieves at least the sender utility of this scheme, which is the number of coordinates where a or b has bit 1. Combining this with the conservation bound on the sum of receiver and sender utilities shows that the receiver utility of any sender-optimal scheme is bounded by the prior utility coordinate by coordinate.

  1. The coupling is nonnegative. automation

    By unfolding the definition of the coupling, the value is either 1/2 or 0, both of which are nonnegative.

    lines 10–11

      dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]
      split_ifs <;> linarith
  2. The coupling is symmetric.

    Symmetry holds because the condition (x = a ∧ y = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ y = a) is symmetric in x and y.

    lines 17–29

      dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]
      by_cases h : (x = a ∧ y = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ y = a)
      · have h' : (y = a ∧ x = b) ∨ (y = b ∧ x = a) := by
          rcases h with ⟨rfl, rfl⟩ | ⟨rfl, rfl⟩
          · right; exact ⟨rfl, rfl⟩
          · left; exact ⟨rfl, rfl⟩
        rw [if_pos h, if_pos h']
      · have h' : ¬ ((y = a ∧ x = b) ∨ (y = b ∧ x = a)) := by
          intro hc
          rcases hc with ⟨rfl, rfl⟩ | ⟨rfl, rfl⟩
          · apply h; right; exact ⟨rfl, rfl⟩
          · apply h; left; exact ⟨rfl, rfl⟩
        rw [if_neg h, if_neg h']
  3. The coupling has marginals matching the prior.

    The sum over y restricts to {a, b} since the coupling vanishes elsewhere; checking x = a, x = b, and x ∉ {a, b} matches μ(x) in all cases.

    lines 36–78

      classical
      have hsupp_zero : ∀ z, z ≠ a → z ≠ b → μ z = 0 := by
        intro z hza hzb
        by_contra hz
        have := (hμ_supp z).mp hz
        tauto
      have hν_zero : ∀ y, y ≠ a → y ≠ b → persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y = 0 := by
        intro y hya hyb
        dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]
        split_ifs with h
        · rcases h with ⟨-, rfl⟩ | ⟨-, rfl⟩ <;> tauto
        · rfl
      have hsum : ∑ y, persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y =
          persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x a +
          persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x b := by
        have hsub : ∑ y, persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y =
            ∑ y ∈ ({a, b} : Finset (ι → Bool)), persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y := by
          rw [← sum_subset (subset_univ _)]
          intro y _ hy
          rw [mem_insert, mem_singleton, not_or] at hy
          exact hν_zero y hy.1 hy.2
        rw [hsub, sum_insert (by simp [hab]), sum_singleton]
      rw [hsum]
      by_cases hxa : x = a
      · rw [hxa]
        dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]
        have h1 : ¬ ((a = a ∧ a = b) ∨ (a = b ∧ a = a)) := by
          intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨-, hc⟩ | ⟨hc, -⟩ <;> exact hab hc
        have h2 : (a = a ∧ b = b) ∨ (a = b ∧ b = a) := Or.inl ⟨rfl, rfl⟩
        rw [if_neg h1, if_pos h2, zero_add, ← hxa, hxa, hμa]
      · by_cases hxb : x = b
        · rw [hxb]
          dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]
          have h1 : (b = a ∧ a = b) ∨ (b = b ∧ a = a) := Or.inr ⟨rfl, rfl⟩
          have h2 : ¬ ((b = a ∧ b = b) ∨ (b = b ∧ b = a)) := by
            intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨hc, -⟩ | ⟨-, hc⟩ <;> exact hab (hc.symm)
          rw [if_pos h1, if_neg h2, add_zero, ← hxb, hxb, hμb]
        · dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]
          have h1 : ¬ ((x = a ∧ a = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ a = a)) := by
            intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨rfl, -⟩ | ⟨rfl, -⟩ <;> tauto
          have h2 : ¬ ((x = a ∧ b = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ b = a)) := by
            intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨rfl, -⟩ | ⟨rfl, -⟩ <;> tauto
          rw [if_neg h1, if_neg h2, add_zero, hsupp_zero x hxa hxb]
  4. The sender utility of the pair-OR scheme is the number of coordinates where a or b is true.

    Evaluating the pair-OR sender utility formula simplifies to the sum over all coordinates of whether a_i or b_i is true.

    lines 85–161

      classical
      rw [persuasion_pair_or_sender_utility]
      have h_inner : ∀ x, ∑ y, persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y *
            ((univ.filter (fun i => (x i || y i) = true)).card : ℝ) =
          (if x = a then (1 / 2) * ((univ.filter (fun i => (a i || b i) = true)).card : ℝ) else 0) +
          (if x = b then (1 / 2) * ((univ.filter (fun i => (b i || a i) = true)).card : ℝ) else 0) := by
        intro x
        have hν_zero : ∀ y, y ≠ a → y ≠ b → persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y = 0 := by
          intro y hya hyb
          dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]
          split_ifs with h
          · rcases h with ⟨-, rfl⟩ | ⟨-, rfl⟩ <;> tauto
          · rfl
        have hsum : ∑ y, persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y *
              ((univ.filter (fun i => (x i || y i) = true)).card : ℝ) =
            persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x a *
              ((univ.filter (fun i => (x i || a i) = true)).card : ℝ) +
            persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x b *
              ((univ.filter (fun i => (x i || b i) = true)).card : ℝ) := by
          have hsub : ∑ y, persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y *
                ((univ.filter (fun i => (x i || y i) = true)).card : ℝ) =
              ∑ y ∈ ({a, b} : Finset (ι → Bool)), persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y *
                ((univ.filter (fun i => (x i || y i) = true)).card : ℝ) := by
            rw [← sum_subset (subset_univ _)]
            intro y _ hy
            rw [mem_insert, mem_singleton, not_or] at hy
            rw [hν_zero y hy.1 hy.2, zero_mul]
          rw [hsub, sum_insert (by simp [hab]), sum_singleton]
        rw [hsum]
        by_cases hxa : x = a
        · rw [hxa]
          dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]
          have h1 : ¬ ((a = a ∧ a = b) ∨ (a = b ∧ a = a)) := by
            intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨-, hc⟩ | ⟨hc, -⟩ <;> exact hab hc
          have h2 : (a = a ∧ b = b) ∨ (a = b ∧ b = a) := Or.inl ⟨rfl, rfl⟩
          rw [if_neg h1, if_pos h2, zero_mul, zero_add]
          rw [if_pos rfl, if_neg hab, add_zero]
        · by_cases hxb : x = b
          · rw [hxb]
            dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]
            have h1 : (b = a ∧ a = b) ∨ (b = b ∧ a = a) := Or.inr ⟨rfl, rfl⟩
            have h2 : ¬ ((b = a ∧ b = b) ∨ (b = b ∧ b = a)) := by
              intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨hc, -⟩ | ⟨-, hc⟩ <;> exact hab (hc.symm)
            rw [if_pos h1, if_neg h2, zero_mul, add_zero]
            rw [if_neg (Ne.symm hab), if_pos rfl, zero_add]
          · dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]
            have h1 : ¬ ((x = a ∧ a = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ a = a)) := by
              intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨rfl, -⟩ | ⟨rfl, -⟩ <;> tauto
            have h2 : ¬ ((x = a ∧ b = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ b = a)) := by
              intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨rfl, -⟩ | ⟨rfl, -⟩ <;> tauto
            rw [if_neg h1, if_neg h2, zero_mul, zero_mul, add_zero]
            rw [if_neg hxa, if_neg hxb, add_zero]
      simp_rw [h_inner]
      have houter : ∑ x, ((if x = a then (1 / 2) * ((univ.filter (fun i => (a i || b i) = true)).card : ℝ) else 0) +
          (if x = b then (1 / 2) * ((univ.filter (fun i => (b i || a i) = true)).card : ℝ) else 0)) =
          (1 / 2) * ((univ.filter (fun i => (a i || b i) = true)).card : ℝ) +
          (1 / 2) * ((univ.filter (fun i => (b i || a i) = true)).card : ℝ) := by
        rw [sum_add_distrib]
        congr 1
        · rw [← sum_subset (subset_univ {a})]
          · rw [sum_singleton, if_pos rfl]
          · intro x _ hx
            rw [mem_singleton] at hx
            rw [if_neg hx]
        · rw [← sum_subset (subset_univ {b})]
          · rw [sum_singleton, if_pos rfl]
          · intro x _ hx
            rw [mem_singleton] at hx
            rw [if_neg hx]
      rw [houter]
      have hsymm_card : (univ.filter (fun i => (b i || a i) = true)).card =
          (univ.filter (fun i => (a i || b i) = true)).card := by
        congr 1; ext i; simp [Bool.or_comm]
      rw [hsymm_card, ← add_mul]
      have hhalf : (1 / 2 : ℝ) + 1 / 2 = 1 := by ring
      rw [hhalf, one_mul]
      exact Finset.natCast_card_filter _ _
  5. The prior marginal at bit i is (1/2)1(a_i = true) + (1/2)1(b_i = true).

    The sum over states restricts to {a, b}, giving the sum of 1/2 for each state where bit i is true.

    lines 168–188

      classical
      dsimp [persuasion_marginal]
      have hzero : ∀ x, x ≠ a → x ≠ b → (if x i = true then μ x else 0) = 0 := by
        intro x hxa hxb
        by_contra h
        have hx : μ x ≠ 0 := by
          intro hμx
          rw [hμx, ite_self] at h
          exact h rfl
        have := (hμ_supp x).mp hx
        tauto
      have hsum : ∑ x, (if x i = true then μ x else 0) =
          (if a i = true then μ a else 0) + (if b i = true then μ b else 0) := by
        have hsub : ∑ x, (if x i = true then μ x else 0) =
            ∑ x ∈ ({a, b} : Finset (ι → Bool)), (if x i = true then μ x else 0) := by
          rw [← sum_subset (subset_univ _)]
          intro x _ hx
          rw [mem_insert, mem_singleton, not_or] at hx
          exact hzero x hx.1 hx.2
        rw [hsub, sum_insert (by simp [hab]), sum_singleton]
      rw [hsum, hμa, hμb]
  6. Prior utility is nonnegative and bounding receiver utility.

    Extracting support states, checking obedience, and bounding R(q) <= R_0(μ) for any optimal q implies the supremum is bounded by prior utility.

    lines 196–250

      classical
      obtain ⟨a, b, hab, hS⟩ := Finset.card_eq_two.mp hμ.2.1
      have ha : a ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun x => μ x ≠ 0) := by
        rw [hS]; simp
      have hb : b ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun x => μ x ≠ 0) := by
        rw [hS]; simp
      rw [mem_filter] at ha hb
      have hμ_supp : ∀ x, μ x ≠ 0 ↔ x = a ∨ x = b := by
        intro x
        constructor
        · intro hx
          have hxS : x ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun x => μ x ≠ 0) := by
            rw [mem_filter]; exact ⟨mem_univ _, hx⟩
          rw [hS, mem_insert, mem_singleton] at hxS
          exact hxS
        · rintro (rfl | rfl)
          · exact ha.2
          · exact hb.2
      have hμa : μ a = 1 / 2 := by
        have := hμ.2.2 a ha.2
        norm_num at this; exact this
      have hμb : μ b = 1 / 2 := by
        have := hμ.2.2 b hb.2
        norm_num at this; exact this
      set ν := persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b
      have hν0 : ∀ x y, 0 ≤ ν x y := persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling_nonneg a b
      have hνs : ∀ x y, ν x y = ν y x := persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling_symm a b
      have hνμ : ∀ x, ∑ y, ν x y = μ x :=
        persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling_marginal μ a b hab hμ_supp hμa hμb
      have hobs := persuasion_pair_or_scheme_obedient μ ν hν0 hνs hνμ
      have hSor := persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling_sender_utility a b hab
      have h_marg := persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_marginal μ a b hab hμ_supp hμa hμb
      have hp := persuasion_marginal_mem_Icc μ hμ.1
      have hR0 : 0 ≤ persuasion_prior_utility μ :=
        sum_nonneg fun i _ => le_max_of_le_left (hp i).1
      have key : ∀ q, is_sender_optimal_scheme μ q →
          persuasion_receiver_utility q ≤ persuasion_prior_utility μ := by
        rintro q ⟨hq, hopt⟩
        have h1 := persuasion_receiver_add_sender_le μ hμ.1.2 q hq
        have h2 := hopt _ hobs
        rw [hSor] at h2
        have hc : (Fintype.card ι : ℝ) = ∑ _i : ι, (1 : ℝ) := by simp
        have h3 : (Fintype.card ι : ℝ) + ∑ i, persuasion_marginal μ i -
            ∑ i, (if (a i || b i) = true then 1 else 0 : ℝ) ≤
            persuasion_prior_utility μ := by
          rw [hc, persuasion_prior_utility, ← sum_add_distrib, ← sum_sub_distrib]
          apply sum_le_sum
          intro i _
          rw [h_marg i]
          cases a i <;> cases b i <;> simp
        linarith
      apply Real.sSup_le
      · rintro r ⟨q, hq, rfl⟩
        exact key q hq
      · exact hR0

Written by a model (gemini-3.8-flash) from the Lean proof and the goal states Lean reported at each step. Lean verified the proof; this explanation is a reading aid and is not itself machine-checked.

Lean source view module on GitHub

open Finsetnoncomputable def persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]    (a b : ι → Bool) (x y : ι → Bool) : ℝ :=  if (x = a ∧ y = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ y = a) then 1 / 2 else 0lemma persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling_nonneg {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]    (a b : ι → Bool) (x y : ι → Bool) :    0 ≤ persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y := by  dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]  split_ifs <;> linarithlemma persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling_symm {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]    (a b : ι → Bool) (x y : ι → Bool) :    persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y =      persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b y x := by  dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]  by_cases h : (x = a ∧ y = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ y = a)  · have h' : (y = a ∧ x = b) ∨ (y = b ∧ x = a) := by      rcases h with ⟨rfl, rfl⟩ | ⟨rfl, rfl⟩      · right; exact ⟨rfl, rfl⟩      · left; exact ⟨rfl, rfl⟩    rw [if_pos h, if_pos h']  · have h' : ¬ ((y = a ∧ x = b) ∨ (y = b ∧ x = a)) := by      intro hc      rcases hc with ⟨rfl, rfl⟩ | ⟨rfl, rfl⟩      · apply h; right; exact ⟨rfl, rfl⟩      · apply h; left; exact ⟨rfl, rfl⟩    rw [if_neg h, if_neg h']lemma persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling_marginal {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]    (μ : (ι → Bool) → ℝ) (a b : ι → Bool) (hab : a ≠ b)    (hμ_supp : ∀ x, μ x ≠ 0 ↔ x = a ∨ x = b)    (hμa : μ a = 1 / 2) (hμb : μ b = 1 / 2) (x : ι → Bool) :    ∑ y, persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y = μ x := by  classical  have hsupp_zero : ∀ z, z ≠ a → z ≠ b → μ z = 0 := by    intro z hza hzb    by_contra hz    have := (hμ_supp z).mp hz    tauto  have hν_zero : ∀ y, y ≠ a → y ≠ b → persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y = 0 := by    intro y hya hyb    dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]    split_ifs with h    · rcases h with ⟨-, rfl⟩ | ⟨-, rfl⟩ <;> tauto    · rfl  have hsum : ∑ y, persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y =      persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x a +      persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x b := by    have hsub : ∑ y, persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y =        ∑ y ∈ ({a, b} : Finset (ι → Bool)), persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y := by      rw [← sum_subset (subset_univ _)]      intro y _ hy      rw [mem_insert, mem_singleton, not_or] at hy      exact hν_zero y hy.1 hy.2    rw [hsub, sum_insert (by simp [hab]), sum_singleton]  rw [hsum]  by_cases hxa : x = a  · rw [hxa]    dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]    have h1 : ¬ ((a = a ∧ a = b) ∨ (a = b ∧ a = a)) := by      intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨-, hc⟩ | ⟨hc, -⟩ <;> exact hab hc    have h2 : (a = a ∧ b = b) ∨ (a = b ∧ b = a) := Or.inl ⟨rfl, rfl⟩    rw [if_neg h1, if_pos h2, zero_add, ← hxa, hxa, hμa]  · by_cases hxb : x = b    · rw [hxb]      dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]      have h1 : (b = a ∧ a = b) ∨ (b = b ∧ a = a) := Or.inr ⟨rfl, rfl⟩      have h2 : ¬ ((b = a ∧ b = b) ∨ (b = b ∧ b = a)) := by        intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨hc, -⟩ | ⟨-, hc⟩ <;> exact hab (hc.symm)      rw [if_pos h1, if_neg h2, add_zero, ← hxb, hxb, hμb]    · dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]      have h1 : ¬ ((x = a ∧ a = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ a = a)) := by        intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨rfl, -⟩ | ⟨rfl, -⟩ <;> tauto      have h2 : ¬ ((x = a ∧ b = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ b = a)) := by        intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨rfl, -⟩ | ⟨rfl, -⟩ <;> tauto      rw [if_neg h1, if_neg h2, add_zero, hsupp_zero x hxa hxb]lemma persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling_sender_utility {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]    (a b : ι → Bool) (hab : a ≠ b) :    persuasion_sender_utility (persuasion_pair_or_scheme      (persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b)) =      ∑ i, (if (a i || b i) = true then 1 else 0 : ℝ) := by  classical  rw [persuasion_pair_or_sender_utility]  have h_inner : ∀ x, ∑ y, persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y *        ((univ.filter (fun i => (x i || y i) = true)).card : ℝ) =      (if x = a then (1 / 2) * ((univ.filter (fun i => (a i || b i) = true)).card : ℝ) else 0) +      (if x = b then (1 / 2) * ((univ.filter (fun i => (b i || a i) = true)).card : ℝ) else 0) := by    intro x    have hν_zero : ∀ y, y ≠ a → y ≠ b → persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y = 0 := by      intro y hya hyb      dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]      split_ifs with h      · rcases h with ⟨-, rfl⟩ | ⟨-, rfl⟩ <;> tauto      · rfl    have hsum : ∑ y, persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y *          ((univ.filter (fun i => (x i || y i) = true)).card : ℝ) =        persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x a *          ((univ.filter (fun i => (x i || a i) = true)).card : ℝ) +        persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x b *          ((univ.filter (fun i => (x i || b i) = true)).card : ℝ) := by      have hsub : ∑ y, persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y *            ((univ.filter (fun i => (x i || y i) = true)).card : ℝ) =          ∑ y ∈ ({a, b} : Finset (ι → Bool)), persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b x y *            ((univ.filter (fun i => (x i || y i) = true)).card : ℝ) := by        rw [← sum_subset (subset_univ _)]        intro y _ hy        rw [mem_insert, mem_singleton, not_or] at hy        rw [hν_zero y hy.1 hy.2, zero_mul]      rw [hsub, sum_insert (by simp [hab]), sum_singleton]    rw [hsum]    by_cases hxa : x = a    · rw [hxa]      dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]      have h1 : ¬ ((a = a ∧ a = b) ∨ (a = b ∧ a = a)) := by        intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨-, hc⟩ | ⟨hc, -⟩ <;> exact hab hc      have h2 : (a = a ∧ b = b) ∨ (a = b ∧ b = a) := Or.inl ⟨rfl, rfl⟩      rw [if_neg h1, if_pos h2, zero_mul, zero_add]      rw [if_pos rfl, if_neg hab, add_zero]    · by_cases hxb : x = b      · rw [hxb]        dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]        have h1 : (b = a ∧ a = b) ∨ (b = b ∧ a = a) := Or.inr ⟨rfl, rfl⟩        have h2 : ¬ ((b = a ∧ b = b) ∨ (b = b ∧ b = a)) := by          intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨hc, -⟩ | ⟨-, hc⟩ <;> exact hab (hc.symm)        rw [if_pos h1, if_neg h2, zero_mul, add_zero]        rw [if_neg (Ne.symm hab), if_pos rfl, zero_add]      · dsimp [persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling]        have h1 : ¬ ((x = a ∧ a = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ a = a)) := by          intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨rfl, -⟩ | ⟨rfl, -⟩ <;> tauto        have h2 : ¬ ((x = a ∧ b = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ b = a)) := by          intro hc; rcases hc with ⟨rfl, -⟩ | ⟨rfl, -⟩ <;> tauto        rw [if_neg h1, if_neg h2, zero_mul, zero_mul, add_zero]        rw [if_neg hxa, if_neg hxb, add_zero]  simp_rw [h_inner]  have houter : ∑ x, ((if x = a then (1 / 2) * ((univ.filter (fun i => (a i || b i) = true)).card : ℝ) else 0) +      (if x = b then (1 / 2) * ((univ.filter (fun i => (b i || a i) = true)).card : ℝ) else 0)) =      (1 / 2) * ((univ.filter (fun i => (a i || b i) = true)).card : ℝ) +      (1 / 2) * ((univ.filter (fun i => (b i || a i) = true)).card : ℝ) := by    rw [sum_add_distrib]    congr 1    · rw [← sum_subset (subset_univ {a})]      · rw [sum_singleton, if_pos rfl]      · intro x _ hx        rw [mem_singleton] at hx        rw [if_neg hx]    · rw [← sum_subset (subset_univ {b})]      · rw [sum_singleton, if_pos rfl]      · intro x _ hx        rw [mem_singleton] at hx        rw [if_neg hx]  rw [houter]  have hsymm_card : (univ.filter (fun i => (b i || a i) = true)).card =      (univ.filter (fun i => (a i || b i) = true)).card := by    congr 1; ext i; simp [Bool.or_comm]  rw [hsymm_card, ← add_mul]  have hhalf : (1 / 2 : ℝ) + 1 / 2 = 1 := by ring  rw [hhalf, one_mul]  exact Finset.natCast_card_filter _ _lemma persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_marginal {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]    (μ : (ι → Bool) → ℝ) (a b : ι → Bool) (hab : a ≠ b)    (hμ_supp : ∀ x, μ x ≠ 0 ↔ x = a ∨ x = b)    (hμa : μ a = 1 / 2) (hμb : μ b = 1 / 2) (i : ι) :    persuasion_marginal μ i = (if a i = true then 1 / 2 else 0) + (if b i = true then 1 / 2 else 0) := by  classical  dsimp [persuasion_marginal]  have hzero : ∀ x, x ≠ a → x ≠ b → (if x i = true then μ x else 0) = 0 := by    intro x hxa hxb    by_contra h    have hx : μ x ≠ 0 := by      intro hμx      rw [hμx, ite_self] at h      exact h rfl    have := (hμ_supp x).mp hx    tauto  have hsum : ∑ x, (if x i = true then μ x else 0) =      (if a i = true then μ a else 0) + (if b i = true then μ b else 0) := by    have hsub : ∑ x, (if x i = true then μ x else 0) =        ∑ x ∈ ({a, b} : Finset (ι → Bool)), (if x i = true then μ x else 0) := by      rw [← sum_subset (subset_univ _)]      intro x _ hx      rw [mem_insert, mem_singleton, not_or] at hx      exact hzero x hx.1 hx.2    rw [hsub, sum_insert (by simp [hab]), sum_singleton]  rw [hsum, hμa, hμb]open Finset in/-- For 2 states (m = 1), the optimal receiver ratio is at most 1. -/theorem persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le    (ι : Type) [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (μ : (ι → Bool) → ℝ)    (hμ : is_uniform_bit_prior 2 μ) :    persuasion_max_receiver_utility μ ≤ persuasion_prior_utility μ := by  classical  obtain ⟨a, b, hab, hS⟩ := Finset.card_eq_two.mp hμ.2.1  have ha : a ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun x => μ x ≠ 0) := by    rw [hS]; simp  have hb : b ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun x => μ x ≠ 0) := by    rw [hS]; simp  rw [mem_filter] at ha hb  have hμ_supp : ∀ x, μ x ≠ 0 ↔ x = a ∨ x = b := by    intro x    constructor    · intro hx      have hxS : x ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun x => μ x ≠ 0) := by        rw [mem_filter]; exact ⟨mem_univ _, hx⟩      rw [hS, mem_insert, mem_singleton] at hxS      exact hxS    · rintro (rfl | rfl)      · exact ha.2      · exact hb.2  have hμa : μ a = 1 / 2 := by    have := hμ.2.2 a ha.2    norm_num at this; exact this  have hμb : μ b = 1 / 2 := by    have := hμ.2.2 b hb.2    norm_num at this; exact this  set ν := persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling a b  have hν0 : ∀ x y, 0 ≤ ν x y := persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling_nonneg a b  have hνs : ∀ x y, ν x y = ν y x := persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling_symm a b  have hνμ : ∀ x, ∑ y, ν x y = μ x :=    persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling_marginal μ a b hab hμ_supp hμa hμb  have hobs := persuasion_pair_or_scheme_obedient μ ν hν0 hνs hνμ  have hSor := persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_coupling_sender_utility a b hab  have h_marg := persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_le_marginal μ a b hab hμ_supp hμa hμb  have hp := persuasion_marginal_mem_Icc μ hμ.1  have hR0 : 0 ≤ persuasion_prior_utility μ :=    sum_nonneg fun i _ => le_max_of_le_left (hp i).1  have key : ∀ q, is_sender_optimal_scheme μ q →      persuasion_receiver_utility q ≤ persuasion_prior_utility μ := by    rintro q ⟨hq, hopt⟩    have h1 := persuasion_receiver_add_sender_le μ hμ.1.2 q hq    have h2 := hopt _ hobs    rw [hSor] at h2    have hc : (Fintype.card ι : ℝ) = ∑ _i : ι, (1 : ℝ) := by simp    have h3 : (Fintype.card ι : ℝ) + ∑ i, persuasion_marginal μ i -        ∑ i, (if (a i || b i) = true then 1 else 0 : ℝ) ≤        persuasion_prior_utility μ := by      rw [hc, persuasion_prior_utility, ← sum_add_distrib, ← sum_sub_distrib]      apply sum_le_sum      intro i _      rw [h_marg i]      cases a i <;> cases b i <;> simp    linarith  apply Real.sSup_le  · rintro r ⟨q, hq, rfl⟩    exact key q hq  · exact hR0
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