AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

is_pareto_optimal

def

In a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent, an allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ is Pareto optimal if x is feasible in E and there does not exist any feasible allocation y : Agent → Good → ℝ in E such that every agent i receives at least as high utility under y as under x (∀ i, E.utility i (x i) ≤ E.utility i (y i)) and at least one agent receives strictly higher utility under y than under x (∃ i, E.utility i (x i) < E.utility i (y i)).

Statement

def is_pareto_optimal {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent]
    (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ) : Prop
Defined in
Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, Microeconomic Theory, ch. 10.B & 16.C
Verified
01 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • ExchangeEconomyA pure exchange economy with agent type Agent and commodity type Good consists of a non-negative initial endowment of each good for each…
  • is_feasible_allocationIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent, an allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ is feasible if every agent receives a…
Used by 2
  • pareto_optimal_implies_weakly_pareto_optimalIn a pure exchange economy E with finite, nonempty agent type Agent, if an allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ is Pareto optimal in E, then x…
  • first_welfare_theoremThe First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: in a pure exchange economy E with finite, nonempty agent type Agent and finite,…

Read back from the Lean

For an exchange economy E with finite agent type Agent and goods type Good, an allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ is Pareto optimal if: 1. x is a feasible allocation in E, and 2. There does not exist an allocation y : Agent → Good → ℝ such that: a. y is a feasible allocation in E, b. For every agent i : Agent, E.utility i (x i) ≤ E.utility i (y i), and c. There exists an agent i : Agent such that E.utility i (x i) < E.utility i (y i).

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- In a pure exchange economy, an allocation is Pareto optimal (Pareto efficient) if it is feasible and there is no feasible allocation where every agent is at least as well off and at least one agent is strictly better off. -/
def is_pareto_optimal {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent]
    (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ) : Prop := is_feasible_allocation E x ∧
  ¬ ∃ y : Agent → Good → ℝ, is_feasible_allocation E y ∧
    (∀ i, E.utility i (x i) ≤ E.utility i (y i)) ∧
    (∃ i, E.utility i (x i) < E.utility i (y i))
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