first_welfare_theorem
The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: in a pure exchange economy E with finite, nonempty agent type Agent and finite, nonempty commodity type Good, if price vector p has strictly positive prices, every agent has a strictly monotone utility function, and (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium in E, then the allocation x is Pareto optimal in E.
Statement
theorem first_welfare_theorem {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] [Nonempty Agent] [Nonempty Good] (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ) (hp : ∀ g, 0 < p g) (h_mono : ∀ i, StrictMono (E.utility i)) (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x) : is_pareto_optimal E x
- Formalizes
- Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, Proposition 16.C.1
- Verified
- 01 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 5
- ExchangeEconomyA pure exchange economy with agent type Agent and commodity type Good consists of a non-negative initial endowment of each good for each…
- is_walrasian_equilibriumIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite commodities Good, a price vector p : Good → ℝ and an allocation x : Agent…
- is_pareto_optimalIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent, an allocation x : Agent → Good → ℝ is Pareto optimal if x is feasible in E and…
- walrasian_expenditure_gt_of_utility_gtIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite commodities Good, if (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then for any…
- walrasian_expenditure_ge_of_utility_geIn a pure exchange economy E with finite agents Agent and finite, nonempty commodity type Good, if price vector p has strictly positive…
Read back from the Lean
For any finite, nonempty types Agent and Good, let E be an exchange economy where each agent i has a non-negative endowment E.endowment i : Good → ℝ and a utility function E.utility i : (Good → ℝ) → ℝ. Let p : Good → ℝ be a price vector and x : Agent → Good → ℝ an allocation.
Assuming:
1. hp: Every good has strictly positive price (∀ g, 0 < p g).
2. h_mono: Every agent's utility function is strictly monotone (StrictMono (E.utility i) for each i, i.e., with respect to the pointwise partial order on Good → ℝ, if a ≤ b pointwise and a ≠ b, then E.utility i a < E.utility i b).
3. h_walras: (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium of E, meaning:
- x is a feasible allocation (non-negative for all agents and goods, and for each good g, the total allocation ∑ i, x i g is at most the total endowment ∑ i, E.endowment i g),
- for each agent i, x i satisfies their budget constraint (∑ g, p g * x i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g), and
- for each agent i and any non-negative bundle y : Good → ℝ satisfying the budget constraint (∑ g, p g * y g ≤ ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g), E.utility i y ≤ E.utility i (x i).
Then x is Pareto optimal in E, meaning:
- x is a feasible allocation, and
- there is no feasible allocation y : Agent → Good → ℝ such that E.utility i (x i) ≤ E.utility i (y i) for all agents i and E.utility i (x i) < E.utility i (y i) for at least one agent i.
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/-- First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: every Walrasian equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal under strictly monotone utilities and strictly positive prices. -/theorem first_welfare_theorem {Agent Good : Type*} [Fintype Agent] [Fintype Good] [Nonempty Agent] [Nonempty Good] (E : ExchangeEconomy Agent Good) (p : Good → ℝ) (x : Agent → Good → ℝ) (hp : ∀ g, 0 < p g) (h_mono : ∀ i, StrictMono (E.utility i)) (h_walras : is_walrasian_equilibrium E p x) : is_pareto_optimal E x := by constructor · exact h_walras.1 · rintro ⟨y, hy_feas, hy_ge, ⟨i0, hi0⟩⟩ have h_budget_ge : ∀ i : Agent, ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * y i g := by intro i exact walrasian_expenditure_ge_of_utility_ge E p x i hp (h_mono i) h_walras (y i) (hy_feas.1 i) (hy_ge i) have h_budget_gt : ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i0 g < ∑ g, p g * y i0 g := by exact walrasian_expenditure_gt_of_utility_gt E p x h_walras i0 (y i0) (hy_feas.1 i0) hi0 have h_sum_lt : ∑ i, ∑ g, p g * E.endowment i g < ∑ i, ∑ g, p g * y i g := by apply Finset.sum_lt_sum · intro i _ exact h_budget_ge i · exact ⟨i0, Finset.mem_univ i0, h_budget_gt⟩ rw [Finset.sum_comm] at h_sum_lt have h_comm_right : ∑ i, ∑ g, p g * y i g = ∑ g, ∑ i, p g * y i g := Finset.sum_comm rw [h_comm_right] at h_sum_lt have h_endow_eq : (∑ g, ∑ i, p g * E.endowment i g) = ∑ g, p g * ∑ i, E.endowment i g := by refine Finset.sum_congr rfl fun g _ => ?_ rw [Finset.mul_sum] have h_y_eq : (∑ g, ∑ i, p g * y i g) = ∑ g, p g * ∑ i, y i g := by refine Finset.sum_congr rfl fun g _ => ?_ rw [Finset.mul_sum] rw [h_endow_eq, h_y_eq] at h_sum_lt have h_sum_le : ∑ g, p g * ∑ i, y i g ≤ ∑ g, p g * ∑ i, E.endowment i g := by apply Finset.sum_le_sum intro g _ exact mul_le_mul_of_nonneg_left (hy_feas.2 g) (le_of_lt (hp g)) exact lt_irrefl _ (h_sum_lt.trans_le h_sum_le)