is_pareto_optimal_chores
def
An allocation of chores is Pareto optimal if no allocation Pareto-dominates it.
Statement
def is_pareto_optimal_chores {m n : ℕ} (c : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (σ : Fin m → Fin n) : Prop
- Defined in
- On the Incompatibility of Weighted PROPX and Pareto Optimality for Indivisible Chores, arXiv:2608.16130 v1, Defs. 2.3-2.4; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-03
- Verified
- 03 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- pareto_dominates_choresAn allocation of chores Pareto-dominates another if it costs every agent at most as much and some agent strictly less.
- Used by 4
- weighted_propx_po_chores_incompatible_three_seventhsFor two agents with shares (3/7, 4/7), six chores and strictly positive additive costs (262,111,258,100,1,103) and (135,75,113,1,43,53),…
- weighted_propx_po_chores_incompatible_nine_twentiethsFor two agents with shares (9/20, 11/20), six chores and strictly positive additive costs (114,222,1,177,64,166) and…
- weighted_propx_po_chores_incompatible_two_fifthsFor two agents with shares (2/5, 3/5), five chores and strictly positive additive costs (38,1,111,72,48) and (31,54,113,40,1), no…
- no_weighted_propx_po_of_nat_checkReduction for kernel checking: if, for natural-number costs C and shares num/den, every allocation that is weighted PROPX (multiplied…
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- Pareto optimality for chores (arXiv:2608.16130, Def. 2.4): no (integral) allocation Pareto-dominates `σ`. -/ def is_pareto_optimal_chores {m n : ℕ} (c : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (σ : Fin m → Fin n) : Prop := ¬ ∃ τ, pareto_dominates_chores c τ σ