AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

pareto_dominates_chores

def

An allocation of chores Pareto-dominates another if it costs every agent at most as much and some agent strictly less.

Statement

def pareto_dominates_chores {m n : ℕ} (c : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (τ σ : Fin m → Fin n) : Prop
Defined in
On the Incompatibility of Weighted PROPX and Pareto Optimality for Indivisible Chores, arXiv:2608.16130 v1, Defs. 2.3-2.4; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-03
Verified
03 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • additive_valuationThe additive valuation with item values u: a bundle is worth the sum of its items' values.
  • bundle_ofUnder an allocation that gives each item x to agent s(x), agent i's bundle is the set of items given to i.
Used by 2
  • wpropx_gadget_of_domPareto domination for natural-number costs implies Pareto domination for the costs cast to the reals.
  • is_pareto_optimal_choresAn allocation of chores is Pareto optimal if no allocation Pareto-dominates it.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- Pareto domination for chores (arXiv:2608.16130, Def. 2.4): under `τ` every agent has cost at most her cost under `σ`, and some agent has strictly smaller cost. -/
def pareto_dominates_chores {m n : ℕ} (c : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (τ σ : Fin m → Fin n) : Prop :=
  (∀ i, additive_valuation (c i) (bundle_of τ i) ≤ additive_valuation (c i) (bundle_of σ i)) ∧
    ∃ j, additive_valuation (c j) (bundle_of τ j) < additive_valuation (c j) (bundle_of σ j)
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