AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

is_procurement_pne

def

A profile of (multi-)bids is a pure Nash equilibrium of the procurement game if all bids are nonnegative and no agent can gain by switching to any other nonnegative list of bids.

Statement

def is_procurement_pne (alloc pay : List ℝ → ℕ → ℝ) {n : ℕ} (c : Fin n → ℝ)
    (β : Fin n → List ℝ) : Prop
Defined in
arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 2 (Def. 1 utilities, Def. 3 PNE, Def. 4 Sybil-proof, Def. 5 ex-post safe), complete-information procurement of one divisible unit of work; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-03
Verified
03 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • procurement_agent_utilityThe utility of an agent with cost c who submits the bids mine (one per identity) while all other identities bid others: the sum over…
  • procurement_others_bidsThe list of all bids of agents other than i in a profile where each agent submits a list of bids.
Used by 6

Lean source view module on GitHub

def is_procurement_pne (alloc pay : List ℝ → ℕ → ℝ) {n : ℕ} (c : Fin n → ℝ)
    (β : Fin n → List ℝ) : Prop :=
  (∀ i, ∀ b ∈ β i, 0 ≤ b) ∧
    ∀ i (σ : List ℝ), (∀ b ∈ σ, 0 ≤ b) →
      procurement_agent_utility alloc pay (c i) σ (procurement_others_bids β i) ≤
        procurement_agent_utility alloc pay (c i) (β i) (procurement_others_bids β i)
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