is_procurement_pne
def
A profile of (multi-)bids is a pure Nash equilibrium of the procurement game if all bids are nonnegative and no agent can gain by switching to any other nonnegative list of bids.
Statement
def is_procurement_pne (alloc pay : List ℝ → ℕ → ℝ) {n : ℕ} (c : Fin n → ℝ) (β : Fin n → List ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 2 (Def. 1 utilities, Def. 3 PNE, Def. 4 Sybil-proof, Def. 5 ex-post safe), complete-information procurement of one divisible unit of work; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-03
- Verified
- 03 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- procurement_agent_utilityThe utility of an agent with cost c who submits the bids
mine(one per identity) while all other identities bidothers: the sum over… - procurement_others_bidsThe list of all bids of agents other than i in a profile where each agent submits a list of bids.
- procurement_agent_utilityThe utility of an agent with cost c who submits the bids
- Used by 6
- proportional_share_no_pne_of_safe_all_costsIf a proportional-share mechanism is ex-post safe for every nonnegative cost, then no profile with at least one agent and nonnegative…
- exists_sybil_proof_ex_post_safe_non_winner_take_all_procurementThere is a procurement mechanism that is Sybil-proof, ex-post safe for all costs at most 1, whose pure Nash equilibria (for costs at most…
- stake_share_pne_exists_and_non_winner_take_allFor n >= 2 agents with costs in [0, L] and K M >= 3 n^2 L, the stake-share mechanism has a pure Nash equilibrium, and every pure Nash…
- stake_share_pne_existsFor n >= 2 agents with costs in [0, L], if K M >= 3 n^2 L then the stake-share mechanism has a pure Nash equilibrium (each agent…
- stake_share_pne_non_winner_take_allIn the stake-share mechanism with K, M > 0 and all costs at most L, every pure Nash equilibrium (with at least one agent) gives positive…
- stake_share_two_agent_pneWith pool 1 + max(0, 2 - W) and costs 1/5 and 9/10, the stakes 24/35 and 18/35 form a pure Nash equilibrium.
Lean source view module on GitHub
def is_procurement_pne (alloc pay : List ℝ → ℕ → ℝ) {n : ℕ} (c : Fin n → ℝ) (β : Fin n → List ℝ) : Prop := (∀ i, ∀ b ∈ β i, 0 ≤ b) ∧ ∀ i (σ : List ℝ), (∀ b ∈ σ, 0 ≤ b) → procurement_agent_utility alloc pay (c i) σ (procurement_others_bids β i) ≤ procurement_agent_utility alloc pay (c i) (β i) (procurement_others_bids β i)