stake_share_two_agent_pne
theoremverifiedoriginal
With pool 1 + max(0, 2 - W) and costs 1/5 and 9/10, the stakes 24/35 and 18/35 form a pure Nash equilibrium.
Statement
theorem stake_share_two_agent_pne :
is_procurement_pne proportional_share_alloc
(proportional_share_pay (stake_share_pool 1 1 2)) ![1/5, 9/10] ![[24/35], [18/35]]- Related work
- operator (Claude), 2026-10-03: answer to the open question of arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 6 (is there a procurement mechanism that is Sybil-proof and ex-post safe with non-winner-take-all equilibria?): yes, the stake-share mechanism (work and a pool L + K max(0, M - W) shared in proportion to free stakes) is Sybil-proof, ex-post safe for costs up to L, and all its PNE give work to at least two agents; ex-post safety for all costs is impossible together with PNE in this proportional-share class
- Verified
- 03 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 7
- is_procurement_pneA profile of (multi-)bids is a pure Nash equilibrium of the procurement game if all bids are nonnegative and no agent can gain by…
- procurement_others_bids_sumThe total of the other agents' bids is the total of all bids minus agent i's total.
- proportional_share_allocProportional-share allocation: identity j receives the fraction b_j / W of the work, W being the total bid.
- proportional_share_payProportional-share payment with total pool pool(W): identity j is paid its work share times pool(W).
- proportional_share_utility_eqIn a proportional-share mechanism an agent's utility is s / (s + R) times (pool(s + R) - c).
- stake_share_deviation_leA bound used for the two-agent equilibrium: with pool 1 + max(0, 2 - W), a stake s against others' total R yields utility at most u0 when…
- stake_share_poolThe stake-share pool L + K max(0, M - W) as a function of the total stake W.
- Used by 1
- exists_sybil_proof_ex_post_safe_non_winner_take_all_procurementThere is a procurement mechanism that is Sybil-proof, ex-post safe for all costs at most 1, whose pure Nash equilibria (for costs at most…
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/-- Two agents with costs `1/5` and `9/10`, stake-share pool `1 + max 0 (2 - W)`: the stakes `24/35` and `18/35` form a pure Nash equilibrium, splitting the work `4/7` and `3/7`. -/theorem stake_share_two_agent_pne : is_procurement_pne proportional_share_alloc (proportional_share_pay (stake_share_pool 1 1 2)) ![1/5, 9/10] ![[24/35], [18/35]] := by refine ⟨fun i b hb => ?_, fun i σ hσ => ?_⟩ · fin_cases i <;> simp at hb <;> rw [hb] <;> norm_num · have hσs : 0 ≤ σ.sum := List.sum_nonneg hσ rw [proportional_share_utility_eq, proportional_share_utility_eq, procurement_others_bids_sum] fin_cases i · simp only [Fin.sum_univ_two, Fin.zero_eta, Fin.isValue, Matrix.cons_val_zero, Matrix.cons_val_one, List.sum_singleton] norm_num unfold stake_share_pool norm_num apply stake_share_deviation_le (by norm_num) hσs (by norm_num) (by norm_num) intro _; nlinarith [sq_nonneg (σ.sum - 24/35)] · simp only [Fin.sum_univ_two, Fin.mk_one, Fin.isValue, Matrix.cons_val_zero, Matrix.cons_val_one, List.sum_singleton] norm_num unfold stake_share_pool norm_num apply stake_share_deviation_le (by norm_num) hσs (by norm_num) (by norm_num) intro _; nlinarith [sq_nonneg (σ.sum - 18/35)]