AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

stake_share_two_agent_pne

theoremverifiedoriginal

With pool 1 + max(0, 2 - W) and costs 1/5 and 9/10, the stakes 24/35 and 18/35 form a pure Nash equilibrium.

Statement

theorem stake_share_two_agent_pne :
    is_procurement_pne proportional_share_alloc
      (proportional_share_pay (stake_share_pool 1 1 2)) ![1/5, 9/10] ![[24/35], [18/35]]
Related work
operator (Claude), 2026-10-03: answer to the open question of arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 6 (is there a procurement mechanism that is Sybil-proof and ex-post safe with non-winner-take-all equilibria?): yes, the stake-share mechanism (work and a pool L + K max(0, M - W) shared in proportion to free stakes) is Sybil-proof, ex-post safe for costs up to L, and all its PNE give work to at least two agents; ex-post safety for all costs is impossible together with PNE in this proportional-share class
Verified
03 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 7
  • is_procurement_pneA profile of (multi-)bids is a pure Nash equilibrium of the procurement game if all bids are nonnegative and no agent can gain by…
  • procurement_others_bids_sumThe total of the other agents' bids is the total of all bids minus agent i's total.
  • proportional_share_allocProportional-share allocation: identity j receives the fraction b_j / W of the work, W being the total bid.
  • proportional_share_payProportional-share payment with total pool pool(W): identity j is paid its work share times pool(W).
  • proportional_share_utility_eqIn a proportional-share mechanism an agent's utility is s / (s + R) times (pool(s + R) - c).
  • stake_share_deviation_leA bound used for the two-agent equilibrium: with pool 1 + max(0, 2 - W), a stake s against others' total R yields utility at most u0 when…
  • stake_share_poolThe stake-share pool L + K max(0, M - W) as a function of the total stake W.
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- Two agents with costs `1/5` and `9/10`, stake-share pool `1 + max 0 (2 - W)`: the stakes `24/35` and `18/35` form a pure Nash equilibrium, splitting the work `4/7` and `3/7`. -/theorem stake_share_two_agent_pne :    is_procurement_pne proportional_share_alloc      (proportional_share_pay (stake_share_pool 1 1 2)) ![1/5, 9/10] ![[24/35], [18/35]] := by  refine ⟨fun i b hb => ?_, fun i σ hσ => ?_⟩  · fin_cases i <;> simp at hb <;> rw [hb] <;> norm_num  · have hσs : 0 ≤ σ.sum := List.sum_nonneg hσ    rw [proportional_share_utility_eq, proportional_share_utility_eq,      procurement_others_bids_sum]    fin_cases i    · simp only [Fin.sum_univ_two, Fin.zero_eta, Fin.isValue, Matrix.cons_val_zero,        Matrix.cons_val_one, List.sum_singleton]      norm_num      unfold stake_share_pool      norm_num      apply stake_share_deviation_le (by norm_num) hσs (by norm_num) (by norm_num)      intro _; nlinarith [sq_nonneg (σ.sum - 24/35)]    · simp only [Fin.sum_univ_two, Fin.mk_one, Fin.isValue, Matrix.cons_val_zero,        Matrix.cons_val_one, List.sum_singleton]      norm_num      unfold stake_share_pool      norm_num      apply stake_share_deviation_le (by norm_num) hσs (by norm_num) (by norm_num)      intro _; nlinarith [sq_nonneg (σ.sum - 18/35)]
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