pcp_two_venue_equilibrium_of_fixed_point
lemmaverified
Two venues, alpha = 1/2, beta = 2, any number of types: if the impacts u induced by best responses to the normalised impacts (1, y) satisfy u_0 > 0 and u_1 = y u_0, then (u_0, u_1) with the closed-form actions is a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Statement
open Finset in lemma pcp_two_venue_equilibrium_of_fixed_point {n : ℕ} (θ μ : Fin n → ℝ) (c : Fin n → Fin 2 → ℝ) (hc : ∀ i j, 0 < c i j) (y : ℝ) (hu0 : 0 < pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 0) (hfix : pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 1 = y * pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 0) : pcp_is_equilibrium (1 / 2) 2 θ μ c (pcp_half_two_action c ![pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 0, pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 1]) ![pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 0, pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 1]
- Source
- step towards publication_choice_three_equilibria / publication_choice_three_types_three_equilibria (The Publication Choice Problem, AAAI 2026 (arXiv:2511.13678v2), Theorem 4.1 and Conjecture 4.2)
- Verified
- 06 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 5
- pcp_venue_impactVenue impact (eq. (2)): the impact of venue j is the average type of the researchers publishing there, weighted by type densities and…
- pcp_is_equilibriumPure-strategy equilibrium of a Publication Choice Problem (Definition 1): every researcher type best responds to the venue impacts, and…
- pcp_half_two_best_responseFor alpha = 1/2 and beta = 2 with positive costs, the closed form of Lemma 3.1, a_j = v_j^4 / (c_j^2 sum_l v_l^4/c_l), solves the…
- pcp_half_two_actionThe closed-form action profile of Lemma 3.1 for alpha = 1/2, beta = 2: type i publishes v_j^4 / (c_ij^2 sum_l v_l^4 / c_il) at venue j.
- pcp_half_two_action_smulThe closed-form action profile is unchanged when all venue impacts are multiplied by the same nonzero factor.
- Used by 1
- publication_choice_three_types_three_equilibriaA Publication Choice Problem with three strictly ordered types and two venues, alpha = 1/2, beta = 2, satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, has…
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open Finset in/-- Two venues, `α = 1/2`, `β = 2`, any number of types: let `u` be the venue impacts induced by the closed-form actions against the normalised impacts `(1, y)`. If `u 0 > 0` and `u 1 = y * u 0`, then the impacts `(u 0, u 1)` together with the closed-form actions against them form a pure-strategy equilibrium. -/lemma pcp_two_venue_equilibrium_of_fixed_point {n : ℕ} (θ μ : Fin n → ℝ) (c : Fin n → Fin 2 → ℝ) (hc : ∀ i j, 0 < c i j) (y : ℝ) (hu0 : 0 < pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 0) (hfix : pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 1 = y * pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 0) : pcp_is_equilibrium (1 / 2) 2 θ μ c (pcp_half_two_action c ![pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 0, pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 1]) ![pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 0, pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) 1] := by set u := pcp_venue_impact θ μ (pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y]) with hu have hv : (![u 0, u 1] : Fin 2 → ℝ) = fun j => u 0 * (![1, y] : Fin 2 → ℝ) j := by funext j; fin_cases j · simp · simp [hfix, mul_comm] have ha : pcp_half_two_action c ![u 0, u 1] = pcp_half_two_action c ![1, y] := by rw [hv, pcp_half_two_action_smul _ _ hu0.ne'] refine ⟨fun i => ?_, fun j => ?_⟩ · have hD : 0 < ∑ l, (![u 0, u 1] : Fin 2 → ℝ) l ^ 4 / c i l := by rw [Fin.sum_univ_two] have h0 := hc i 0 have h1 := hc i 1 simp only [Matrix.cons_val_zero, Matrix.cons_val_one] positivity exact pcp_half_two_best_response (c i) _ (hc i) hD · rw [ha, hu]; fin_cases j <;> rfl