pcp_is_equilibrium
def
Pure-strategy equilibrium of a Publication Choice Problem (Definition 1): every researcher type best responds to the venue impacts, and the venue impacts are consistent with the action profile.
Statement
def pcp_is_equilibrium {n k : ℕ} (α β : ℝ) (θ μ : Fin n → ℝ) (c a : Fin n → Fin k → ℝ) (v : Fin k → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- The Publication Choice Problem, AAAI 2026 (arXiv:2511.13678v2), Sec. 2-4, Definition 1, Lemma 3.1, Assumptions 1-2, Theorem 4.1 and Conjecture 4.2; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-04
- Verified
- 03 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- pcp_is_best_responseProgram (1) of the Publication Choice Problem: a publication vector a is a best response to venue impacts v and costs c if it is…
- pcp_venue_impactVenue impact (eq. (2)): the impact of venue j is the average type of the researchers publishing there, weighted by type densities and…
- Used by 6
- publication_choice_many_type_equilibrium_not_uniqueConjecture 4.2 of arXiv:2511.13678 is false: not every Publication Choice Problem with three strictly ordered types satisfying the…
- publication_choice_binary_equilibrium_not_uniqueTheorem 4.1 of arXiv:2511.13678 is false: not every binary-type Publication Choice Problem satisfying the standing assumptions, Assumption…
- pcp_two_venue_equilibrium_of_fixed_pointTwo venues, alpha = 1/2, beta = 2, any number of types: if the impacts u induced by best responses to the normalised impacts (1, y)…
- pcx_equilibrium_of_rootEvery positive root x of pcx_poly gives a pure-strategy equilibrium of the binary instance with impacts pcx_impact x, in which every type…
- publication_choice_three_types_three_equilibriaA Publication Choice Problem with three strictly ordered types and two venues, alpha = 1/2, beta = 2, satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, has…
- publication_choice_three_equilibriaA binary-type Publication Choice Problem with two venues, alpha = 1/2, beta = 2, satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, has three pure-strategy…
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/-- Pure-strategy equilibrium of a Publication Choice Problem (arXiv:2511.13678, Definition 1): every type best responds to the venue impacts `v`, and `v` is consistent with the action profile `a`. -/ def pcp_is_equilibrium {n k : ℕ} (α β : ℝ) (θ μ : Fin n → ℝ) (c a : Fin n → Fin k → ℝ) (v : Fin k → ℝ) : Prop := (∀ i, pcp_is_best_response α β (c i) v (a i)) ∧ ∀ j, v j = pcp_venue_impact θ μ a j