AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

persuasion_slice_values

theoremverified

R_max and R_0 for the slice prior.

Statement

open Finset in
theorem persuasion_slice_values (m : ℕ) (hm : 1 ≤ m) :
    persuasion_max_receiver_utility (persuasion_slice_prior m) =
        (2 * m - 1).choose m + (2 * m + 1).choose m * (m / (2 * m + 1 : ℝ)) ∧
      persuasion_prior_utility (persuasion_slice_prior m) =
        (2 * m + 1).choose m * ((m + 1) / (2 * m + 1 : ℝ))
Source
step towards persuasion_receiver_ratio_optimal_constant (optimal receiver-utility constant 3/2, open in arXiv:2606.22226 v1, Sec. 5)
Verified
06 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 18
Used by 1
  • persuasion_slice_ratioThe slice prior attains ratio (3m+1)/(2m+2). For the prior uniform over the 2m+1 states of persuasion_slice_prior m (coordinates =…

Lean source view module on GitHub

open Finset in/-- Every coordinate of the slice prior has marginal `m/(2m+1)`. -/lemma persuasion_slice_marginal (m : ℕ) (i : persuasion_slice_coord m) :    persuasion_marginal (persuasion_slice_prior m) i = m / (2 * m + 1 : ℝ) := by  classical  unfold persuasion_marginal persuasion_slice_prior  have e : ∀ x : persuasion_slice_coord m → Bool, (if x i = true then      ∑ s, (if persuasion_slice_state m s = x then 1 / (2 * m + 1 : ℝ) else 0) else 0) =      ∑ s, if persuasion_slice_state m s = x then        (if persuasion_slice_state m s i = true then 1 / (2 * m + 1 : ℝ) else 0) else 0 := by    intro x    by_cases hx : x i = true    · rw [if_pos hx]      apply sum_congr rfl; intro s _      by_cases h : persuasion_slice_state m s = x      · rw [if_pos h, if_pos h, h, if_pos hx]      · rw [if_neg h, if_neg h]    · rw [if_neg hx]      symm      apply sum_eq_zero; intro s _      by_cases h : persuasion_slice_state m s = x      · rw [if_pos h, h, if_neg hx]      · rw [if_neg h]  rw [sum_congr rfl (fun x _ => e x), sum_comm]  simp only [sum_ite_eq, Finset.mem_univ, if_true]  rw [← sum_filter, Finset.sum_const, nsmul_eq_mul]  have : (Finset.univ.filter (fun s => persuasion_slice_state m s i = true)) = i.1 := by    ext s; simp [persuasion_slice_state]  rw [this, i.2]  ringopen Finset in/-- `R_max` and `R_0` for the slice prior. -/theorem persuasion_slice_values (m : ℕ) (hm : 1 ≤ m) :    persuasion_max_receiver_utility (persuasion_slice_prior m) =        (2 * m - 1).choose m + (2 * m + 1).choose m * (m / (2 * m + 1 : ℝ)) ∧      persuasion_prior_utility (persuasion_slice_prior m) =        (2 * m + 1).choose m * ((m + 1) / (2 * m + 1 : ℝ)) := by  classical  have hK : (0 : ℝ) < 2 * m + 1 := by positivity  have hP : ∑ i, persuasion_marginal (persuasion_slice_prior m) i =      (2 * m + 1).choose m * (m / (2 * m + 1 : ℝ)) := by    simp only [persuasion_slice_marginal, Finset.sum_const, card_univ, persuasion_slice_card_coord,      nsmul_eq_mul]  have hμ := (persuasion_slice_prior_is_bit_prior m).2  have hobs := persuasion_slice_scheme_obedient m hm  have hS := persuasion_slice_scheme_sender_utility m hm  have hRS := persuasion_pair_or_receiver_add_sender (persuasion_slice_prior m) hμ    (persuasion_slice_coupling m) (persuasion_slice_coupling_marginal m hm)  rw [persuasion_slice_card_coord, hP] at hRS  have hR : persuasion_receiver_utility (persuasion_slice_scheme m) =      (2 * m - 1).choose m + (2 * m + 1).choose m * (m / (2 * m + 1 : ℝ)) := by    unfold persuasion_slice_scheme at hS ⊢    linarith  have hopt : is_sender_optimal_scheme (persuasion_slice_prior m) (persuasion_slice_scheme m) :=    ⟨hobs, fun q' hq' => hS ▸ persuasion_slice_sender_le m hm q' hq'⟩  refine ⟨?_, ?_⟩  · apply IsGreatest.csSup_eq    refine ⟨⟨persuasion_slice_scheme m, hopt, hR.symm⟩, ?_⟩    rintro r ⟨q, ⟨hq, hqopt⟩, rfl⟩    have h1 := persuasion_receiver_add_sender_le _ hμ q hq    rw [persuasion_slice_card_coord, hP] at h1    have h2 := hqopt _ hobs    rw [hS] at h2    linarith  · unfold persuasion_prior_utility    simp only [persuasion_slice_marginal, Finset.sum_const, card_univ, persuasion_slice_card_coord,      nsmul_eq_mul]    congr 1    rw [max_eq_right]    · field_simp; ring    · rw [div_le_iff₀ hK]      have : (m : ℝ) / (2 * m + 1) * (2 * m + 1) = m := by field_simp      nlinarith
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