persuasion_marginal
def
The marginal p_i(μ) = Pr_μ[X_i = 1].
Statement
open Finset in noncomputable def persuasion_marginal {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (μ : (ι → Bool) → ℝ) (i : ι) : ℝ
- Defined in
- Quantifying Theoretical AI Alignment Guarantees: Receiver-Utility Bounds in Bayesian Persuasion, arXiv:2606.22226 v1, Sec. 3 (bit-string model, direct obedient form, R_0, S*, R_max); formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-03
- Verified
- 03 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 6
- persuasion_uniform_two_states_ratio_leFor every finite type ι and every prior μ on ι → Bool that is uniform on 2 distinct states, the maximum receiver utility R_max(μ) is at…
- persuasion_max_receiver_utility_learXiv:2606.22226, Theorem 4.5 (ratio form). For every prior, R_max(μ) ≤ (3/2) R_0(μ).
- persuasion_pair_or_receiver_add_senderA pair-OR scheme never recommends 0 on a coordinate equal to 1, so the trade-off of Lemma 4.2 is an equality for it.
- persuasion_receiver_add_sender_leSender–receiver trade-off (Lemma 4.2). R(q) + S(q) ≤ n + ∑_i p_i(μ).
- persuasion_slice_valuesR_max and R_0 for the slice prior.
- persuasion_prior_utilityThe receiver's prior-only utility R_0(μ) = ∑_i max(p_i, 1 - p_i).
Lean source view module on GitHub
open Finset in /-- The marginal `p_i(μ) = Pr_μ[X_i = 1]`. -/ noncomputable def persuasion_marginal {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (μ : (ι → Bool) → ℝ) (i : ι) : ℝ := ∑ x, if x i = true then μ x else 0