publication_choice_three_equilibria
theoremverifiedoriginal
A binary-type Publication Choice Problem with two venues, alpha = 1/2, beta = 2, satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, has three pure-strategy equilibria with pairwise different venue impacts (all publication amounts positive).
Statement
theorem publication_choice_three_equilibria :
pcp_is_valid (1 / 2) 2 pcx_theta pcx_mu pcx_cost ∧ pcp_monotone_cost_ratio pcx_theta pcx_cost ∧
pcp_noncompetitive_venue pcx_cost ∧
∃ (a₁ a₂ a₃ : Fin 2 → Fin 2 → ℝ) (v₁ v₂ v₃ : Fin 2 → ℝ),
pcp_is_equilibrium (1 / 2) 2 pcx_theta pcx_mu pcx_cost a₁ v₁ ∧
pcp_is_equilibrium (1 / 2) 2 pcx_theta pcx_mu pcx_cost a₂ v₂ ∧
pcp_is_equilibrium (1 / 2) 2 pcx_theta pcx_mu pcx_cost a₃ v₃ ∧
(∀ i j, 0 < a₁ i j ∧ 0 < a₂ i j ∧ 0 < a₃ i j) ∧ v₁ 0 < v₂ 0 ∧ v₂ 0 < v₃ 0- Related work
- operator (Claude), 2026-10-04: counterexamples to Theorem 4.1 (binary types) and Conjecture 4.2 (many types) of The Publication Choice Problem, AAAI 2026 (arXiv:2511.13678v2), Sec. 2-4, Definition 1, Lemma 3.1, Assumptions 1-2, Theorem 4.1 and Conjecture 4.2; alpha = 1/2, beta = 2, two venues; three equilibria obtained from the intermediate value theorem on the cleared fixed-point polynomial; instances found by numerical search, signs checked in exact arithmetic and by the Lean kernel
- Verified
- 03 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 13
- pcp_is_equilibriumPure-strategy equilibrium of a Publication Choice Problem (Definition 1): every researcher type best responds to the venue impacts, and…
- pcp_is_validStanding assumptions of a Publication Choice Problem: alpha in (0,1), beta > 1, positive type densities, types and costs, and costs…
- pcp_monotone_cost_ratioAssumption 1 (Monotone Cost Ratio): for types theta_i < theta_i' and venues j < j', c_ij / c_i'j < c_ij' / c_i'j'.
- pcp_noncompetitive_venueAssumption 2 (non-competitive venue): the least competitive venue has the same publication cost for every type.
- pcx_thetaTypes of the binary instance: theta = (1, 8).
- pcx_muType densities of the binary instance: (1/3, 2/3).
- pcx_costCosts of the binary instance: venue 0 costs 1 for both types; venue 1 costs 128 for the low type and 8 for the high type.
- pcx_assumptionsThe binary instance satisfies the standing assumptions with alpha = 1/2, beta = 2, Assumption 1 (MCR) and Assumption 2 (non-competitive…
- pcx_impactVenue impacts of the binary instance as functions of x: ((1+16x)/(1+2x), (1+4096x)/(1+512x)).
- pcx_actionThe closed-form best-response action profile of the binary instance against the venue impacts pcx_impact x.
- pcx_equilibrium_of_rootEvery positive root x of pcx_poly gives a pure-strategy equilibrium of the binary instance with impacts pcx_impact x, in which every type…
- pcx_poly_three_rootspcx_poly has a root in each of (11/100, 12/100), (26/100, 27/100) and (41/100, 42/100).
- pcx_impact_zero_strictMonoThe impact (1+16x)/(1+2x) of venue 0 is strictly increasing in x >= 0.
- Used by 1
- publication_choice_binary_equilibrium_not_uniqueTheorem 4.1 of arXiv:2511.13678 is false: not every binary-type Publication Choice Problem satisfying the standing assumptions, Assumption…
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/-- Counterexample to Theorem 4.1 of arXiv:2511.13678 (The Publication Choice Problem, AAAI 2026): a binary-type instance with two venues, `α = 1/2`, `β = 2`, satisfying Assumption 1 (MCR) and Assumption 2 (non-competitive venue), has three pure-strategy equilibria with pairwise different venue impacts, each with every type publishing a positive amount at every venue. -/theorem publication_choice_three_equilibria : pcp_is_valid (1 / 2) 2 pcx_theta pcx_mu pcx_cost ∧ pcp_monotone_cost_ratio pcx_theta pcx_cost ∧ pcp_noncompetitive_venue pcx_cost ∧ ∃ (a₁ a₂ a₃ : Fin 2 → Fin 2 → ℝ) (v₁ v₂ v₃ : Fin 2 → ℝ), pcp_is_equilibrium (1 / 2) 2 pcx_theta pcx_mu pcx_cost a₁ v₁ ∧ pcp_is_equilibrium (1 / 2) 2 pcx_theta pcx_mu pcx_cost a₂ v₂ ∧ pcp_is_equilibrium (1 / 2) 2 pcx_theta pcx_mu pcx_cost a₃ v₃ ∧ (∀ i j, 0 < a₁ i j ∧ 0 < a₂ i j ∧ 0 < a₃ i j) ∧ v₁ 0 < v₂ 0 ∧ v₂ 0 < v₃ 0 := by obtain ⟨hv, hm, hn⟩ := pcx_assumptions obtain ⟨x₁, x₂, x₃, a1, b1, a2, b2, a3, b3, e1, e2, e3⟩ := pcx_poly_three_roots obtain ⟨q1, p1⟩ := pcx_equilibrium_of_root x₁ (by linarith) e1 obtain ⟨q2, p2⟩ := pcx_equilibrium_of_root x₂ (by linarith) e2 obtain ⟨q3, p3⟩ := pcx_equilibrium_of_root x₃ (by linarith) e3 exact ⟨hv, hm, hn, pcx_action x₁, pcx_action x₂, pcx_action x₃, pcx_impact x₁, pcx_impact x₂, pcx_impact x₃, q1, q2, q3, fun i j => ⟨p1 i j, p2 i j, p3 i j⟩, pcx_impact_zero_strictMono (by linarith) (by linarith), pcx_impact_zero_strictMono (by linarith) (by linarith)⟩