AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

rsinv_stability

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

If j strictly prefers i over his final partner, i's final partner has rank ≤ j.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open List Finset in
open GS in
variable {n : ℕ} [NeZero n] in
lemma rsinv_stability (w m : Preferences n) (j i : Fin n)
    (hlt : (m.prefs j).idxOf i < (finalState w m).nextChoice j) :
    (w.prefs i).idxOf (gs w m i) ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf j
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `rsinv_stability`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 8
  • rsinv_finalStateRSInv at finalState.
  • GS.PreferencesList-based preferences: prefs i is a full permutation of Fin n, ordered from most to least preferred.
  • GS.DAStateDA state: per-man proposal cursor + per-woman tentative hold.
  • GS.finalStatefinalState: run daRun with fuel n*n + 1 from initState.
  • GS.gsThe Gale-Shapley function: woman j's partner at termination.
  • GS.pref_list_memEvery element of Fin n appears in a full-permutation list.
  • GS.daRunRun DA for at most fuel steps, stopping early if no free men remain.
  • GS.initStateInitial state: all women free, all men start at proposal index 0.
Used by 1
  • galeShapley_isStableGale-Shapley stability: the DA output has no blocking pair. The statement is in the *market* frame (IsBlocking … (i : M) (j : W)).…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen List Finset inopen GS invariable {n : ℕ} [NeZero n] in/-- If j strictly prefers i over his final partner, i's final partner has rank ≤ j. -/lemma rsinv_stability (w m : Preferences n) (j i : Fin n)    (hlt : (m.prefs j).idxOf i < (finalState w m).nextChoice j) :    (w.prefs i).idxOf (gs w m i) ≤ (w.prefs i).idxOf j := by  have hrs := rsinv_finalState w m j i  have hi_mem : i ∈ (m.prefs j).take ((finalState w m).nextChoice j) := by    rw [List.mem_take_iff_idxOf_lt]    · exact hlt    · exact pref_list_mem _ (m.valid j).1 (m.valid j).2 i  obtain ⟨h, hh, hrk⟩ := hrs hi_mem  -- h = gs w m i (since holding i = some h at finalState)  have hgs : gs w m i = h := by    simp only [gs, finalState] at hh ⊢; simp [hh]  rw [hgs]; exact hrk
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