stake_share_deviation_le
lemmaverified
A bound used for the two-agent equilibrium: with pool 1 + max(0, 2 - W), a stake s against others' total R yields utility at most u0 when the quadratic condition holds below W = 2 and 1 - c <= u0.
Statement
lemma stake_share_deviation_le {R c u0 s : ℝ} (hR : 0 < R) (hs : 0 ≤ s) (hc : c ≤ 1)
(hfar : 1 - c ≤ u0)
(hquad : s + R ≤ 2 → s * (3 - c - (s + R)) ≤ u0 * (s + R)) :
s / (s + R) * (1 + max 0 (2 - (s + R)) - c) ≤ u0- Source
- step towards exists_sybil_proof_ex_post_safe_non_winner_take_all_procurement (Sybil-proof, ex-post safe procurement with non-winner-take-all equilibria, the open question of arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 6)
- Verified
- 06 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Used by 1
- stake_share_two_agent_pneWith pool 1 + max(0, 2 - W) and costs 1/5 and 9/10, the stakes 24/35 and 18/35 form a pure Nash equilibrium.
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lemma stake_share_deviation_le {R c u0 s : ℝ} (hR : 0 < R) (hs : 0 ≤ s) (hc : c ≤ 1) (hfar : 1 - c ≤ u0) (hquad : s + R ≤ 2 → s * (3 - c - (s + R)) ≤ u0 * (s + R)) : s / (s + R) * (1 + max 0 (2 - (s + R)) - c) ≤ u0 := by have hW : 0 < s + R := by linarith rcases le_or_gt (s + R) 2 with h | h · rw [max_eq_right (by linarith), div_mul_eq_mul_div, div_le_iff₀ hW] have := hquad h nlinarith · rw [max_eq_left (by linarith)] have h1 : s / (s + R) ≤ 1 := (div_le_one hW).mpr (by linarith) have h2 : 0 ≤ s / (s + R) := div_nonneg hs hW.le nlinarith