tfx_alphaEFXAt
def
α-EFX of the cumulative allocation after round t: for all agents i ≠ j and every good (copy of type g from round s ≤ t) in j's bundle, v_i(A_i) ≥ α · v_i(A_j \ {that good}).
Statement
def tfx_alphaEFXAt {T m : ℕ} (α : ℝ) (v : Fin 2 → Fin m → ℝ) (σ : Fin T → Fin m → Fin 2) (t : ℕ) : Prop
- Defined in
- Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Structured Constraints (arXiv:2607.17224), Definitions 3, 4 and 8, Theorem 3 and the open question on the approximation ratio of TEFX under identical days (also arXiv:2601.12835); formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-05
- Verified
- 05 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- tfx_bvalTemporal fair division under the identical-days setting (arXiv 2607.17224, arXiv 2601.12835): two agents, T rounds, and in every round one…
- Used by 8
- tfx_round2ARound 2 of the counterexample after round-1 allocation 1, 1, 0.
- tfx_round3_1Round 3 of the counterexample after rounds 1–2 allocations 1, 1, 0 and 1, 0, 1: every allocation of the third round violates α-EFX.
- tfx_round3_2Round 3 of the counterexample after rounds 1–2 allocations 1, 1, 0 and 0, 0, 1: every allocation of the third round violates α-EFX.
- tfx_alphaTEFXα-TEFX: the cumulative allocation is α-EFX after every round.
- tfx_round3_3Round 3 of the counterexample after rounds 1–2 allocations 0, 0, 1 and 1, 1, 0: every allocation of the third round violates α-EFX.
- tfx_round1Round 1 of the counterexample: the agent receiving b must receive nothing else.
- tfx_round3_4Round 3 of the counterexample after rounds 1–2 allocations 0, 0, 1 and 0, 1, 0: every allocation of the third round violates α-EFX.
- tfx_round2BRound 2 of the counterexample after round-1 allocation 0, 0, 1.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- `α`-EFX of the cumulative allocation after round `t`: for all agents `i ≠ j` and every good (copy of type `g` from round `s ≤ t`) in `j`'s bundle, `v_i(A_i) ≥ α · v_i(A_j \ {that good})`. -/ def tfx_alphaEFXAt {T m : ℕ} (α : ℝ) (v : Fin 2 → Fin m → ℝ) (σ : Fin T → Fin m → Fin 2) (t : ℕ) : Prop := ∀ i j : Fin 2, i ≠ j → ∀ (s : Fin T) (g : Fin m), s.val ≤ t → σ s g = j → α * (tfx_bval v σ t i j - v i g) ≤ tfx_bval v σ t i i